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ARTICLES
Creating a Market for Justice; a Market
Incentive Solution to Regulating the
Playing Field: Judicial Deference,
Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair
Play in Online Consumer Arbitration
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons*
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legitimate and capable businesses. The impersonal nature of e-commerce
makes it more difficult for traders to discern a merchant or transaction that will
not satisfy their expectations.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes procedural due process concerns as an element of
arbitration in online dispute resolution ("ODR") in business-to-consumer
("B2C") e-commerce. 2 B2C e-commerce will be worth an estimated $250
billion by the end of 2003, but one factor hindering its growth is the lack of
effective dispute resolution. For reasons of cost, jurisdiction, and other
problems relating to transnational litigation, courts may not be a feasible fo-
rum, thus leaving private mechanisms, such as ODR, as the primary source
of dispute resolution. Existing incentives may provide for a level playing
field for online arbitration in disputes between merchants; however, these
incentives may be nonexistent or inadequate with regard to disputes be-
tween consumers and merchants.
The nature of e-commerce is conducive to creating a context in which
disputes are more likely than in face-to-face transactions. 3 These disputes
must be resolvable in an economically efficient manner, employing proc-
1 Alan Wiener, Regulations and Standards for Online Dispute Resolution: A Primer for
Policymakers and Stakeholders, (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://
www.alanwiener.mediate.com/alanwiener/.
2 While ODR is a range of dispute resolution processes from arbitration to mediation to
chargebacks, see Henry H. Perritt, Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New
Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 675, 675-77 (2000), online arbitration is of
particular concern because it is the only form of ODR that may command the power of the
state to enforce a neutral's award. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudica-
tion as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 247 (1979) (deeming arbitration "effective, in
major part anyway only because public courts enforce such contracts"). Unless the context
requires otherwise, the article will use the acronym "ODR" to mean binding arbitration of e-
commerce disputes that use significant computer-mediated-communication modalities to
substantially further the arbitration processes.
3 See Mary Shannon Martin, Keep It Online: The Hague Convention and the Need for
Online Alternative Dispute Resolution in International Business-To-Consumer E-Commerce,
20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125, 128-32 (2002).
E-commerce transactions are unique for a variety of reasons. First, the nature of e-commerce makes
it possible for a very small Internet 'start-up' to begin doing business and to reach a worldwide mar-
ket with very little initial cost .... Second, e-commerce is unique because it is an area that is just be-
ginning to be regulated, and the traditional rules of contract, privacy, and intellectual property,
including copyright and trademark, are not always applicable to activity within an intangible me-
dium such as the Internet .... Third, with little regulation of the electronic commercial medium, the
potential for defrauding cross-border consumers is great, thus justifying a substantial governmental
interest in protecting the rights of its citizens as consumers. . . . Fourth, governments are interested
in promoting e-commerce because of the technological development it spurs, and the substantial
business it generates .... Fifth, the nature of e-commerce uniquely facilitates the rapid growth of
international business transactions, both large and small.
Id
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esses that the participants to the dispute accept as fair. Otherwise, rational
participants will demand significant economic or other compensation to ar-
bitrage the perceived risk or refuse to engage in e-commerce transactions.4
Some commentators have assumed that the lack of effective B2C dis-
pute resolution modalities is hindering the development of e-commerce.'
One criticism of this assumption is the reality that B2C e-commerce is
growing at a phenomenal rate, and the systemic reality of the e-commerce
market supports this assertion. That the Internet is a "tax free zone, 6 may
contribute to its growth, and this difference accounts for some risks of en-
gaging in e-commerce. American Express®, Visa®, MasterCard®, Dis-
cover®, JBC®, and other credit card issuers are arbitraging the risk by
being the dispute mechanism of last resort for most B2C e-commerce
transactions. 7 In addition, the fastest area of growth in e-commerce is brick
and mortar merchants with strong trademarks who create an equivalent e-
commerce site, thus providing e-consumers with the illusion, if the not real-
ity, of a dispute resolution process. Consumers assume that products pur-
chased online may be returned or disputes may be resolved at the
merchant's local physical location. Finally, many consumers will use e-
commerce websites to obtain information or to compare prices but complete
the transaction at a physical merchant, even if that merchant charges a bit
more for the transaction. For merchants to invest in e-commerce infrastruc-
ture on the speculation that governments will refrain from taxing e-
commerce or that credit card issuers will continue to arbitrage risk is an un-
4 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §4-1-§4-13 (4th ed.
1992).
5 See Perritt, supra note 2, at 675-77; Lucille M. Ponte, Throwing Bad Money after Bad:
Can Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver the Goods for the Unhappy Internet
Shopper?, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 55, 56 n.1 (2001); Public Comments of Paul Ske-
han to FTC Joint Workshop on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Online Consumer
Transactions , at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/comments/skehanl.htm (last visited
Feb. 3, 2003) ("a major reason for the lack of [a European e-commerce market is the] lack of
trust or confidence on the part of the buyer... how can the buyer be confident that-in the
event of the service/goods being unsatisfactory-he or she will be able to complain or seek
redress?").
6 Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title X1, § 1101(a), 112 Stat.
2681-719, 719 (1998); Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Tax Implications for Electronic Commerce
Over the Internet, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 52-60 (2000), at http://joumal.law.ufl.edu/
-techlaw/4-3/quinn.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
7 Perritt, supra note 2, at 694-698 (discussing credit card chargebacks under Regulation Z
and the Fair Credit Billing Act as a means of dispute resolution in e-commerce and noting
that major charge card issuers voluntarily extend similar protections to consumers in other
countries); Victoria C. Crawford, Note, A Proposal to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution as
a Foundation to Build an Independent Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Using Business to
Consumer Transactions as a Model, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 383, 393-96
(2002). American Express®, Visa®, MasterCard®, Discover®, and JBC® are registered
marks of their respective trademark or service mark holders.
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necessarily dangerous reliance on third-parties to grow e-commerce. 8
The e-commerce shopping (contracting) experience takes place in the
context of the consumer's real world experiences. In the "real world" there
are a plethora of consumer protection regulations and judicial processes that
protect the consumer from the full market forces of caveat emptor in the
provisions of goods and services. In addition, these market forces are re-
strained in terms of standard form contracting possibilities. Mercantile ex-
cesses, through standard form contracts that unreasonably shift liability to
consumers or impose obligations on consumers, are limited not only by
market forces, but also by government action. Through consumer protec-
tion legislation and courts, governments are willing to reform consumer
contracts to conform to reasonable consumer expectations and minimal
guarantees of process. Whether online dispute resolution will provide con-
sumers a similar level of protection is a contentious debate among con-
sumer advocates, industry representatives, and regulatory institutions. 9
Relying on the dispute resolution mechanisms provided by traditional
state-sponsored courts is problematic for numerous reasons. First, there are
issues of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the parties. Second, there are
significant costs in terms of litigation in a distant forum. Third, there are
significant questions of which body of law should govern the dispute and
whether a distant court is competent to apply that body of law. Fourth, state
sponsored courts, in the real world, act with glacial speed. This is espe-
cially true in comparison with the rapid change in technology and e-
business practices in cyberspace. In the relatively brief "history" of e-
commerce, courts have not responded to the needs of e-commerce in a
manner that kept pace with the need for e-commerce to be governed by set-
tled principles of law. Finally, the effect given to a court judgment of one
jurisdiction in another jurisdiction is problematic. ' 0
If state sponsored courts are unable to meet the need for B2C dispute
resolution, an alternative is arbitration. Arbitration potentially avoids many
of the pitfalls of using state sponsored courts. Potentially, arbitration is fast,
8 Council Directive 2002/38/EC (May 7, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
tart/cgi/guesten.ksh?paction.getfile=gf&doc=IP/02/ 67301AGED&lg=EN&type=PDF (stat-
ing that after July 1, 2003, non-E.U. suppliers of electronic services must charge the country
specific value added tax [VAT]); see also Nick Wingfield, Under Pressure From States,
More Online Retailers Start Collecting Sales Tax, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2003, at D1 (noting
that Web retailers voluntarily collecting sales taxes in order to forestall mandatory state taxa-
tion of e-commerce).
9 See generally Public Comments of the Department of Commerce, Federal Trade Com-
mission, Joint Workshop on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Online Consumer Transac-
tions (June 6-7, 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/comments /index.htm.
1o See Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law
to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 8 (1998).
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convenient, inexpensive, and permits the parties to contract around jurisdic-
tional and choice of law questions. Further, there is a well-established
treaty regime for the transnational enforcement of arbitral awards."
These advantages seem to recommend arbitration as the B2C dispute
resolution method of choice. However, in the B2C context, the e-business
frequently selects the arbitral forum and pays the associated fees creating an
appearance, if not the reality, of bias. Since it is black letter law that "[b]y
first making the contract then by declaring who should construe it, the
strong could oppress the weak, and in effect so nullify the law as to secure
the enforcement of contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or contrary to pub-
lic policy. ,1 2 This is especially problematic in the e-commerce marketplace
where mass-market standard form contracts contain terms that are unread or
misunderstood by the consumer. When a dispute arises, the consumer then
must take the contract of adhesion to an adjudicatory body that the e-
merchant selected and whose fees and associated costs are paid for by the e-
merchant. The actual, or appearance of, systemic bias in this paradigm may
create a crisis of consumer confidence in e-commerce.
If e-commerce is to reach its full commercial potential, consumers
must have confidence in ODR.13 Broadly, policy makers have three op-
tions. First, governments may affirmatively regulate ODR by accrediting
ODR providers and establishing de jure standards for B2C ODR services.
Second, governments may elect a laissez-fair approach and permit e-
commerce to create institutions that support a market for dispute resolution
services and permit that market to define the standards for consumer dispute
1 See generally Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing
the Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867 (1996).
12 Parsons v. Ambrose, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904);
If permitted to remove all its potential disputes from the public arena, the party with irresistible con-
tracting power will thus have deprived the courts of ... their natural and appropriate function in
cases involving adhesion contract disputes: to redress that imbalance of power. . . However, the ar-
bitration system as it presently exists is ... unlikely to do so at all, systematically or otherwise. Act-
ing in tandem, stimulus-and-response fashion with democratically elected legislatures, vigilant
courts can do much to protect individuals and less powerful enterprises from corporate overreaching,
and to alert the legal apparatus to systemic abuses of power. But they cannot exercise that function if
access to the courts is denied to those who need it most.
Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 789 (2002).
13 Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The
Promise and Challenge of On-Line Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 985, 993-94
(2001); see also Yuko Yasunaga, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Transactions
in the Borderless Online Marketplace (June 29, 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
altdisresolution/comments/post workshopcomments/yasunaga.htm (Yasunaga observed that
"[a]lthough increasing number of population are involved in B2C electronic commerce, both
consumer and business still feel uncomfortable[] [over ... their] lack [of] knowledge about
how to access dispute resolution/redress.").
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resolution. Between these two extremes, there is a third option, the hybrid
approach recommended in this article. Government should not mandate
any new regulations to govern consumer arbitration; it should provide in-
centives such as safe harbor provisions to encourage the development of
processes and procedures that will result in "due process" and "fair play."'
' 4
Affirmative positive government regulations to regulate ODR may not
keep pace with changes in e-commerce technology and business models.
"Top-down" regulation suffers from governmental inefficiency; it is costly and
time-consuming. In the fast moving technical world of the Internet, an enact-
ment may not be promulgated in time to match technology in use. Statutory
prohibitions may fail because they consistently emerge only after the harm has
been done.... Top-down regulation also prevents persons from individually
choosing to allow a "harm" that, in their personal opinion, is "harmless."'
15
Further, in order to be effective in a global e-market place, positive
government regulation would require trans-border coordination between
governments. There are no existing transnational or bilateral institutions to
coordinate this form of government regulation. Nor are there any signifi-
cant efforts to create such institutions. Lacking coordinating institutions
and the political will to support them, the top-down approach to regulating
ODR is doomed to failure.
Alternatively, a laissez-faire market solution focusing solely on con-
sumer action is even less likely to succeed, because the process is not trans-
parent. Consumers do not have the time or the incentive to investigate
ODR options until the post-contract dispute arises. Further, under the re-
peat player paradigm that would dominate B2C ODR, the relevant consum-
ers from the perspective of the ODR providers would be the merchant and
not the consumer. Accordingly, existing direct market-incentives motivate
the ODR provider to cooperate with the merchant rather than a consumer.
Regulatory models that provide voluntary safe harbor provisions, coupled
with explicit incentives to encourage due process and fair play to ameliorate
the repeat-player influence,.may be the superior regulatory models because
these models are flexible and are more likely to keep pace with the evolu-
tion of e-commerce.
This article concludes that a hybrid approach to government incentives
that encourage the development of consumer institutions to counter the
14 See generally POSNER, supra note 4, § 20.3.
'5 Malla Pollack, Opt-in Government: Using the Internet to Empower Choice-Privacy
Application, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 653, 659 (2001); see also United Nations Centre for Trade
Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), Draft Recommendation on Online Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution (ODR), CEFACT/2001/LG14/Rev.8 (June 27, 2002) § 5.3
("formal accreditation processes will hinder the free and rapid development of... dispute
resolution processes.").
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market advantages enjoyed by repeat players (such as merchants) and to
change the judicial standard of review for a consumer arbitration award
may result in a more level playing field for the consumer. For example, one
recommendation is that in the consumer context courts should not auto-
matically grant the arbitral award a deferential standard of review. ' 6 Rather,
courts should examine the processes and procedures that produced the arbi-
tration award. As the processes and procedures used by the arbitrator move
along the continuum from arbitrary to "due process" and "fair play," the
court will give correspondingly greater deference to the arbitral award.
Since awards that fall within these safe harbor provisions will be less ex-
pensive to reduce to a court judgment, the arbitrator and the parties have a
graduated incentive to assure a more level playing field.'7 The appropriate
role of government is to create market incentives to assure a level playing
field for the consumer and prevent arbitral overreaching in B2C ODR.
II. THE B2C E-COMMERCE PARADIGM
At least initially, e-commerce (online contracting) takes place in the
context of the consumer's real world experiences. Therefore, it is useful to
discuss how these experiences coupled with different forms of dispute reso-
lution make e-commerce problematic from the consumer protection per-
spective. Parallel to the real world commercial practices, consumers will
enter into e-commerce relations and arbitration agreements using mass-
market consumer contracts. Mass-market consumer contracts, better known
as either standard form contracts or contracts of adhesion, have a long his-
tory in modem commercial practice and have been the subject of conten-
tious legal scholarship.' 8 Mass-market consumer contracts are pervasive in
e-commerce. There are two primary models for e-commerce contracting:
click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts. Individuals attempting to install
software as a precondition of installing the program must click on "I agree"
(click-wrap contract)' 9 or, while browsing a website, the visitor may see an
invitation to click on a hyperlink to "legal information" or "terms of ser-
16 Cf Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, League of Nations Doc.
C.659(1) M.220(I) 1927 I1, reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION: A COLLECTION OF
THE TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF GENERAL INSTRUMENT 2153
(Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1931) (shifting burdens to the party seeking to enforce the arbitral
award).
17 See Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the tlarmonization of International Commercial
Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 649-50 (1999).
18 Numerous scholars over the past sixty years have expounded on the general debate sur-
rounding standard form contracts. See, e.g. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Stan-
dard Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, n.15 & n.18 (2002);
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239,
n.107 (1995).
19 Specht v. Netcscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, n.3 (2d Cir. 2002).
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vice" (browser-wrap contract). 20 Either model potentially binds the con-
sumer to terms that she is unlikely to have read, much less understood.
The mass-market contract is a double-edged sword.
Because businesses can identify the most sensible allocation of contract risks
better than courts, judicial failure to enforce standard terms can harm both con-
sumers and businesses in [online] environments. Businesses also use their
knowledge and experience in [real world and online] environments to exploit
consumers, knowing that consumers reliably, predictably, and completely fail
to read terms employed in a standard form contract.
21
Thus, "[c]ourts reviewing [online contracts must struggle] mightily to
balance the importance of enforcing reasonable consumer contract terms
against the need to defend consumers against exploitation." 22
Mass-market consumer contracts tend to be drafted beyond the gray
edge of what is legally permissible because these consumer contracts often
remain either unread when the consumer "consents" or untested in the
courts after the dispute arises.23 Reading and understanding standard form
20 Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000); DeJohn v. The
TV Corp. Intern., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918-19 (C.D. I1. 2003); Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 583, 588 (2003) ("no unfairness in Net2Phone's requirement that
certain contractual terms must be accessed via hyperlink, a common practice in internet busi-
ness.").
21 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 432-33;
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his
customers to understand or even to read the standard terms .... Customers do not in fact ordinarily
understand or even read the standard terms. They trust to the good faith of the party using the form.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt b. (1981); Sajida A. Mahdi, Comment, Gate-
way to Arbitration: Issues of Contract Formation under the U. C. C. and the Enforceability of
Arbitration Clauses Included in Standard Form Contracts Shipped with Goods, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 403, 403 (2001) ("Standard form contracts are neither good nor bad, and neither just
nor unjust, for they are necessary and generally mutually beneficial.") (internal quotations
and citation omitted). When a standard form contract or mass-market license merely incor-
porates social norms and the default rules that most reasonable consumers would have
agreed to in an arm's length transaction, then they are beneficial and should enforced. This
article focuses on standard form contracts and mass-market licenses that shift costs and bur-
dens to the unwary and the unknowing without providing any corresponding benefit.
22 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 433.
23 William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System: A Model
Rule That Should Have Been, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 799, 827 (1993); see Hillman & Ra-
chlinski, supra note 18, at 444 ("Businesses often delegate the job of drafting their terms to
lawyers, who believe that they can best serve their clients by composing an arsenal of one-
sided terms without regard to the business environment, or for that matter, anything else.");
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1172, 1222, 1224 (1984). The counter argument is that businesses interested in their reputa-
tion or who are long term players will not supply overly exploitive contract terms because
more sophisticated consumers will pressure business to change the more exploitive terms.
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contracts is difficult and time consuming. Frequently, terms are presented
to the consumer in a manner designed to maximize frustration with reading
the contract while encouraging the consumer to click on "I agree" in order
to satisfy this frustration. For example, after shopping online and selecting
merchandise, filling in the blank order, and entering credit card data, only
then are the terms presented. Only after going through innumerable regis-
tration and survey screens does a small box of dark gray text on lighter gray
background appear and ask the consumer to click "I agree., 24 Contractual
terms may be intermixed with advertising text on the web in such a manner
as to distract from the legally important terms in favor of content that pro-
duces additional sales. 25 Further, there is an economic incentive on the part
of the drafters to include in terrorem clauses in the hopes of dissuading
26consumers from even contemplating litigation or arbitration.
Analogous commercial practices in the real world have led to a well-
developed body of case law analyzing when standard form contracts or in-
dividual terms should be enforced and when courts should either decline to
enforce or reform the contract to meet consumer expectations.27 Businesses
condition consumers that reading standard form contracts is a waste of eve-
ryone's time.28 Consumers "sign standard-form contracts without reading
them carefully because they believe that most businesses are not willing to
risk the cost to their reputation of using terms to exploit consumers. Fi-
nally, consumers might refrain from reading standard forms if they believe
that courts will strike unreasonable terns."2 9
This leads to a policy where courts will enforce standard form con-
tracts that provide mutually beneficial terms but "police the terms of stan-
dard form contracts to protect consumers from exploitation., 30 Doctrinally,
this is found in the common law unconscionability doctrine, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) (amended 1981) and §2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (amended 1989). 3' The unconscionability doc-
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 441-43. In essence, the marketplace will discipline
overly exploitive businesses.
24 See Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 980-81 ("Notice of the license agreement is provided
by small gray text on a gray background.").
25 Web site design itself is instrumental in building trust. See Marie-Christine Roy et al.,
The Impact of Interface Quality on Trust in Web Retailers, at http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/
publication/2001s-32.pdf (Apr. 2001) (finding "a strong relationship between interface
quality and trust.").
26 See Vukowich, supra note 23, at 827.
27 See generally Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 18. Further discussion of this body of
case law and legal commentary is outside the scope of this article, except as it forms a con-
text in which real world consumer expectations affect their online contracting behavior.28 Id. at 448.
29 Id. at 447.
'o Id. at 454.
3" Id. at 459.
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trine permits courts to prevent "unfair surprise." 32 Section 211(3) provides
that if a party has reason to know that a party manifesting assent to a stan-
dard form contract would not do so, if she were aware that it contained a
particular term, that term is not part of the agreement.33 Section 2-302 of
the Uniform Commercial Code permits a court to reform contracts that are
unconscionable.34 The doctrine of reasonable expectations allows a court to
blue line out express contract language or refuse to enforce the language if
the term frustrates the consumer's reasonable expectations. 35 In essence,
32 The unconscionability doctrine has two elements: procedural unconscionabiltiy or sub-
stantive unconscienability. Procedural unconscionability "result[s] from improprieties in
contract formation (such as oral misrepresentations or disparities in bargaining position)
rather than from the terms of the contract itself." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (7th ed.
1999). In the e-commerce context, this could occur through misleading text, colors, or graph-
ics designed to lull the consumer into a false sense of security and to distract from the legal
import of the contact formation. For example, the contact could be so integrated into the site
that the consumer is unaware that she is forming a legal relationship. Substantive uncon-
scionability "result(s] from actual contract terms that are unduly harsh, commercially unrea-
sonable, and grossly unfair given the existing circumstances." Id. Substantive
unconscionability would permit a court to protect a consumer against unfair surprise in the
terms of the contract.
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3), cmt. f (1981) ("Where the other
party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."). Further,
comment (c) states that there are further restrictions that "standard terms may be superseded
by separately negotiated or added terms (§ 203), they are construed against the draftsman (§
206), and they are subject to the overriding obligation of good faith (§ 205) and to the power
of the court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term (§ 208). Moreover, vari-
ous contracts and terms are against public policy and unenforceable."
M 2 U.C.C. § 302 (1989);
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been uncon-
scionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
" See, e.g., C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins, Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (re-
fusing to apply narrow definition on burglary despite express language where narrow defini-
tion would defeat reasonable expectations of a purchaser of burglary insurance);
The reasonable-expectations doctrine, also prominent in insurance form-contract cases, holds that
"[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions
would have negated those expectations." As worded, the doctrine allows courts to overturn express
contract language if the term contradicts the consumer's reasonable expectations.
When applied, the doctrine of reasonable expectations thus creates an affirmative duty on the part of
the business to point out and explain reasonably unexpected terms even if they clearly were stated in
the contract. The doctrine reflects the reality that consumers fail to read their contracts and agree to
be bound only to reasonable boilerplate.
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 458-61.
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"the law presumes the general enforceability of standard terms, while negat-
ing terms that are procured unfairly, are unreasonable or indecent, or are
reasonably unexpected. 36 Within this context of judicial consumer protec-
tion, legislative bodies and administrative agencies have interwoven nu-
merous statutes and regulations that provide additional consumer
protection.37
Consumers assume that this mantle of consumer protection will shield
them in their e-commerce transactions. If consumers have access to courts,
then they would be entitled to the level of protection-equitable, statutory,
or common law-permitted under the relevant law. This article posits that
B2C disputes will not be resolved in court but rather through the private
process of arbitration.
In contrast to courts, arbitrators draw their authority and source(s) of law from
the contract so they are not necessarily bound to base their decision on a par-
ticular domestic law. An arbitral tribunal has no mandate to follow the statutes
of various countries, but it does have a mandate to effectuate the intentions of
the parties.38
Whether an arbitrator drawing her authority from a contract and being
paid by the parties will apply public law principles rather than the private
law of the parties is uncertain. It is unclear whether consumer expectations
formed in the real world regarding standard form contracts will hold true in
e-commerce without some system of government incentives.
III. B2C DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Frequently, commentators offer arbitration as a panacea to B2C dispute
resolution.39 Proponents of arbitration contend that it is fast, inexpensive
36 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 461.
37 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 550-51
(1977); HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW § 128, at 178 (1986)
(modem consumer protection statutes now exist in all states); STUART M. SPEISER ET AL.,
THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 122, § 32:67, at 335 (1992).
38 Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Rusticum Judicium? Private "Courts" Enforcing Private
Law And Public Rights: Regulating Virtual Arbitration In Cyberspace, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
769, 787-788 (1998) (citing MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
121-24 (1994)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
9 GBDe ADR Working Group, Recommendations and Guidelines from GBDe 2000 Mi-
ami Conference, 6 (2000), at http://consumerconfidence.gbde.org/adrrec.html (last visited
July 30, 2002) ("[A]n important catalyst for consumer confidence in electronic commerce is
that Internet merchants offer their customers attractive extra-judicial procedures for settling
disputes as an alternative to the cumbersome and expensive resort to courts."); Frank A.
Cona, Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 BUFF. L. REV.
975, 981-83 (1997).
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and promotes privacy, certainty, and predictability. 40 The arbitral model is
simple. The parties freely contract for a resolution of their dispute.4' In
principle, as long as the arbitrator applies the private law selected by the
parties to their dispute, they have achieved justice. Historically, the pre-
dominant commercial arbitration model focuses on resolving disputes be-
tween members of a given industry.42 In such cases, all parties are
members of the community that established the arbitration process and all
are likely to know and accept the norms and customs that govern the indus-
try.
There is no pressing need for legal accountability when the parties
share a strong set of acceptable values and seek to use arbitration as a
means of preserving and enhancing their relationship. 43 Therefore, under
most national laws and the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Conven-
tion), there are limited grounds on which a court may independently review
an arbitral award to reach the merits of the underlying dispute.44 In con-
40 See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 179-84 (2000) (describing without taking
the position of arbitration advocates). Critics question the purported savings because of the
informality or efficiency of the proceedings is offset by the fact that state court proceedings
are at least in part subsidized by tax payers. See Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New
Wines: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039,
1053 (1998); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1995). Critics of arbitration note that is it not necessarily more efficient
than the judicial system or less expensive. See Kevin C. Kennedy, 31 AM. JUR. POF 3d 496 §
1 (July 2001). Further, ODR is most appropriate when the parties seek to vindicate economic
rights or to restore a relationship. Economic rights cases involve an arbitration determining
liability and damages. ODR does not function effectively to vindicate legal rights. Cona, su-
pra note 38, at 984. Finally, the ability of an arbitrator to award injunctive relief is under the
best of circumstances problematic.
4' Thomas J. Brewer, The Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes: Freedom To Contract For
An Alternative Forum, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 91, 92 (1997).
42 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution
Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 949, 950 (2002). The
merchant tends to specify that "merchant law" will govern the dispute. The existing default
rules in the United States are the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the Convention
for the International Sales of Goods (C.I.S.G.) for cross-border transactions. These bodies of
law are applied even in transactions not involving goods, for example the licensing of soft-
ware or other intellectual property. Courts apply these bodies of law by analogy absent a
more specific body of law to govern the transaction. Both bodies of law assume contracting
between sophisticated merchants who have knowledge that the average consumer does not
possess. See Crawford, supra note 7 at, 386-87. There is no equivalent domestic or interna-
tional body of generally accepted "consumer law." Id.
43 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law through Arbi-
tration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 745-46 (1999).
4Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 30,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 2617, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1970) [hereinafter New York Convention]; see in-
fra section VII.E.2 (discussing grounds on which to review an arbitral award).
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trast, common legal values may not be shared in B2C e-commerce.45 This
industry-focused model of arbitration does not properly reflect the need in
transnational B2C e-commerce, an arbitration model that reflects diverse
social and legal cultures, industries, and constituencies. Thus, there may be
a greater need for some level of judicial review or state intervention to as-
sure that B2C arbitral awards are fair.
The constraint on the existing commercial arbitration model was that it
was between parties who had an ongoing commercial relationship. Implicit
in the ongoing relationship was reputation, professional courtesy, and sym-
metrical knowledge norms that prevented either party or the arbitrator from
overreaching. The relative anonymity of e-commerce attenuates the "rela-
tionship" and the accompanying reputation or social sanctions necessary to
serve as a check on the potential abuses of binding arbitration. 46 Commer-
cial arbitration was based on freely negotiated contracts between sophisti-
cated merchants and, at the time the parties entered into the agreement,
neither party knew if they were more likely to be the complainant or re-
spondent so they negotiated a level playing field.47 In industry, the parties
contracted ex ante for a level playing field or allocated the costs and bur-
dens appropriately to protect their interests.
48
Commercial and industry models are unlikely to reflect the paradig-
matic B2C dispute in e-commerce, disputes between one-time players (con-
sumers) and the repeat players (the merchant, arbitrator, and ODR
provider). The e-commerce B2C paradigm is the opposite of the Business-
to-Business (B2B) paradigm of disputes between repeat players. In the
B2C context, the business selects the ODR provider, and regardless of
whether the merchant or the consumer ultimately pays for the ODR ser-
45 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play And The
Quest For Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 1040-1043 (1999)
(suggesting that "conflicts involving members of different guilds or cultural groups will arise
and that adjudication of such claims will take place in the public courts"); but see Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration and Assimilation, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1053, 1057-60 (1999) (distinguishing
between intra-group arbitration with general arbitration with is more legalistic and adminis-
tered by neutral organizations having no tie to either party).
46 See, e.g., Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa & Emerson H. Tiller, Customer Trust in Virtual Envi-
ronments: A Managerial Perspective, 81 B.U.L. REV. 665, 670 (2001); Llewellyn Joseph
Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or
Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 520
(1997); but see Ronald J. Mann, Information Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Fi-
nancing Transactions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1627, 1658 (2001) (stating that it is "quite plausible
to me that a professional, Internet-based information merchant would be at least as motivated
by pure reputation-based sanctions as a traditional investment bank would be by the combi-
nation of legal sanctions and reputation-based sanctions").
47 Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 697,
699, 748, 771-72 (2001).
48 See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971).
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vices, the ODR provider is dependent solely upon the repeat player (mer-
chant) for future business. In the traditional B2B context, the ODR pro-
vider is dependent on both merchants as sources for future business or
referrals;49 this dependent relationship provided an economic and reputa-
tional interest for the ODR provider to assure a level playing field.50 Infor-
mation asymmetry defines online consumer arbitration. Sophisticated
merchants contract with consumers, who have little incentive to know or
care about dispute resolution modalities before the unlikely event of a dis-
pute arises.5' In the existing B2C model, there are no inherent reputational,
economic or social constraints to prevent the possible abuse of arbitration.
Absent such restraints that are catalysts to a fair dispute resolution para-
digm, some external review process is required to assure consumers that the
process is fair. There may also be a greater need in online consumer arbi-
tration for the government to intervene to protect consumers.
In the international context, the pressing question is how nation-states
may protect the interests of e-consumers without tampering with the elegant
simplicity and efficiency of the existing international commercial arbitra-
tion model. Prior to the advent of e-commerce, most B2C transactions in-
volved parties in the same legal jurisdiction. Foreign goods were imported
through wholesalers and then sold by local merchants. The process had
numerous intermediaries who either assist the consumer to resolve the dis-
pute or who serve as proxies for the foreign supplier in litigation. E-
commerce is characterized by disintermediation. By removing intermediar-
ies, consumers have access to more goods and services at even lower prices
but at the loss of local presence to resolve disputes. The question this arti-
cle addresses is significant because:
for many classes of persons including ... consumers, a properly constructed ar-
bitration may be distinctly preferable to litigation. It may, in fact, be the only
practical option; the critical challenge is to create an environment that ensures
49 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42, at 956.
50 Id.51 Ponte, supra note 5, at 90-91. As one commentator noted, "Not surprisingly, the power
conferred on private parties to use mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses to avoid litiga-
tion in the courts has been abused. Given the structure of the incentives, it could hardly be
otherwise. The cost of imposing these clauses on the uncomprehending, the unaware, and
the unwilling are too low, and the incentives to provide for arbitration procedures likely to be
adequate to protect the legitimate interests of the aggrieved are too few." Haagen, supra note
40, at 1041-42.
52 Lack of access to effective dispute resolution modalities also affects participants' atti-
tudes towards the legitimacy of the system, creates attitudes of alienation, encourages illegal
activities, and generally results in an attitude of powerlessness. Laura Nader, Disputing
Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 999-1003 (1979). While these non-economic
externalities do have economic impact, are significant, and are well worth further study, they
are outside the scope of this article.
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that the arbitration is both fair and appropriate and conducted by arbitrators
who are competent, conscientious and impartial.53
The solution is to create a new paradigm that will govern national and in-
ternational B2C arbitration.
IV. CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses54 in consumer contracts 55 have long
been problematic for consumer advocates and legal commentators both of
whom object to such clauses because:
First, arbitration is "mandatory": individuals have no choice but to agree to ar-
bitrate or do without the good or service altogether, and, once they have agreed
to arbitrate, they cannot decide to go to court when a dispute arises. Second,
arbitration is "unfair": limited discovery, lack of a jury trial or a right to ap-
peal, repeat-player advantages in selecting arbitrators, no class relief, and ex-
cessive fees unfairly disadvantage individuals bringing claims. Finally,
arbitration clauses likewise can be "unfair": clauses drafted by corporations
provide for biased tribunals and distant locations for hearings, preclude recov-
ery of attorneys' fees and punitive damages, shorten time limits for filing
claims, and give the corporation, but not the individual, the ability to go to
court for some or all claims.5 6
There are already signs of the dangers of unchecked arbitration in the do-
mestic context, including arbitration clauses that through choice of arbitral
forum, arbitral institution, cost, or other substantive or procedural rules ren-
der the right to arbitration nugatory while denying consumers effective ac-
cess to the courts. 57 In e-commerce, consumers experience not only the
53 Haagen, supra note 40, at 1043-44 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)). Online transnational arbitration proceedings may
be used to avoid complex and difficult questions regarding jurisdiction, venue, and choice-
of-law. Thornburg, supra note 40, at 179-84.
54 Legal commentators and judges often call or describe a pre-dispute arbitration clause
as "mandatory arbitration." Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims:
Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived its Welcome?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1069,
1069 (1998).
55 This article follows conventional terminology and refers to these contracts as "con-
sumer contracts." See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 47, at 697 n.10; Stephen J. Ware, Con-
sumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington
& Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 196 & n.4 (1998) ("'consumer' to mean ordinary
individuals in whatever capacity: employee, tenant, buyer of goods, etc.").
56 Drahozal, supra note 47, at 697.
57 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (ordering consum-
ers to arbitration before the ICC over a $4,000 dispute); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676
N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (following the decision of the Hill court in up-
holding an arbitration clause but ordering the parties to proceed before the AAA); but see
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting Hill), and
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conventional domestic dangers of arbitration, but also the added risks of
trans-border arbitration. International commercial arbitration law poten-
tially subjects consumers to the unexamined enforcement of inequitable ar-
bitral awards unchecked by any domestic consumer protection regulations.
V. THE EXISTING COMMERCIAL ARBITRAL MODEL
The Internet is especially well suited for a dispute resolution regime
based on communication and contract. Arbitration has four essential ele-
ments. 58 First, the parties must voluntarily agree to resolve their dispute via
arbitration. 59 Second, there must be a written agreement. 60 Third, the dis-
pute must be within the subject matter of the written arbitration agree-
ment.6 1 Fourth, the claim cannot be one reserved by law by the public
courts of ajurisdiction. 62 These essential elements of arbitration may be
replicated and achieved in e-commerce. Although the second requirement
for a written agreement to arbitrate may appear at first blush to be problem-
atic, the contracts of service that make "internectivity" possible between the
networks that comprise the Internet may as a last resort provide the "writ-
ing." Between the companies that provide the access to the Internet or
carry Internet traffic and the sites that aggregate e-merchants or which cre-
ate e-marketplaces, it is virtually impossible for a consumer or merchant to
be in the stream of e-commerce yet outside the stream of contract. 63 Theo-
retically, this seamless web of written contracts may embody the voluntary
agreement to arbitrate and serve as the legal predicate for binding ODR.64
Commercial disputants generally prefer arbitration to litigation be-
ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)).





63 Initially in its crudest form, ODR will consist of an e-mail exchange of documents and
responses to the arbitrator's or opposing party's questions. Based on this evidence, the arbi-
trator will make the award. Already, this process fails to take complete advantage of the ca-
pabilities of computer-mediated communication ("CMC"). Currently, real-time questioning
of witnesses is possible using "chat" programs, and inexpensive real-time audio-video tele-
conferencing is increasingly available.
64 E-SIGN, the federal digital signature and contract law provides that
with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-(l) a signature, con-
tract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforce-
ability solely because it is in electronic form; and (2) a contract relating to such transaction may not
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic
record was used in its formation.
15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2000). As a result, there should be no insurmountable evidentiary hur-
dle to overcome.
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cause, by choosing the forum and the law, parties are assured that their dis-
pute will be resolved under mutually acceptable principles.6 5 In arbitration,
the parties to the dispute are free to select their own choice of law provi-
sions. Arbitration agreements are generally severable from the contract un-
der dispute and may be subject to a different body of law.66 The curial
law67 governing the arbitral proceedings is in almost all cases the law of the
arbitral situs. 68 The arbitral situs is the jurisdiction where the parties agreed
that the arbitration would take place. 69 This is often a legal fiction because
frequently for the convenience of the parties, the actual physical proceed-
ings may take place in a different country. 70 Curial law governs the selec-
tion, appointment, and disqualification of arbitrators, the procedural
conduct of the arbitration, the form of the award, the quality and quantity of
outside judicial supervision, and potentially which jurisdictions will recog-
nize or enforce the award. 71
The problematic nature of the situs of an arbitral award in ODR is
shown by the following example. Suppose one party is in Nigeria, the other
is in Singapore, the arbitrator is in the United States, and the ODR provider
(arbitral institution) is in London. The dispute arises out of an e-commerce
transaction to be licensed and downloaded in Montserrat, West Indies. Nei-
ther the parties nor the arbitrator ever meet in person, and the entire arbitra-
tion takes place in cyberspace. The answer to the question of situs of the
arbitration is not obvious. This may result in an arbitral award that will not
65 Haagen, supra note 40, at 1052-53; American Society of International Law Proceed-
ings, Should International Arbitration Awards be Reviewable?, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
126, 126 (2000) (remarks of Eric A. Posner) [hereinafter Am. Soc. of Int'l L. Proc.].
66 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 16(1)
(1985); Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967); GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1994).
67 Curial law may be referred to as lex arbitri or loi de l'arbitrage, depending on the na-
tional legal regime, and generally refers to the body of law that will govern the arbitration
proceedings. The curial law is "[t]he law governing the arbitral proceedings is usually the
law of the country in which the arbitration hearing is conducted. This law deals with such
issues as the appointment and qualifications of arbitrators, the extent of judicial intervention,
the procedural conduct of the arbitration, and the form of the award." JAY E. GRENIG,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION WITH FORMS, § 12.3 (2d ed. 1997).68 BORN, supra note 66, at 50.
6 9 
Id. at 72.
70 UNCITRAL, supra note 66, at art. 20(1); ISAAK DORE, THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 20-21 (1993). The effect of the parties select-
ing a choice of curial law other than the law of the place where the arbitration is taking place
is undecided. Okezie Chukwumerije, Reform and Consolidation of English Arbitration Law,
8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 21, 29-30 (1997). Undecided does not mean unimportant. See Noah
Rubins, The Arbitral Seat is No Fiction: A Brief Reply to Tatsuya Nakamura's Commentary,
"The Place of Arbitration in International Arbitration-Its Fictitious Nature and Lex Arbi-
tri," 1 MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 23 (2001).
71 Tiffany J. Lanier, Where on Earth Does Cyber-Arbitration Occur?: International Re-
view ofArbitral Awards Rendered Online, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2000).
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be recognized under either municipal law at the named jurisdiction or under
the New York Convention when a party seeks extra territorial enforcement
of the award. 72 While the parties to an e-dispute are largely free to craft the
procedures governing the arbitration by selecting the situs of the arbitration,
the arbitration proceeding must be grounded in some sovereignty if it is to
be given effect in the real world.73
The crucial issue is the choice of curial law in e-commerce because the
choice of law is not intuitively tied to any one country.74 Generally, unless
the parties agree, the arbitrator will determine which substantive body of
law will govern the dispute. An arbitral tribunal has no mandate to follow
the statutes of various countries, but rather its mandate is to effectuate the
intentions of the parties.75 Further, under recognized arbitral principles of
amiable compositeur and ex aequo et bono, if permitted under the arbitra-
tion agreement, arbitrators are free to fashion a "just remedy., 76 This may
include the application of supra-national or a-national normative systems or
may involve looking to existing customs of e-commerce. Thus, arbitrators,
unlike judges, are free to effectuate the contracting parties' choice of sub-
stantive "law," procedure, and forum in adjudicating the dispute to achieve
a just result. This broad grant of discretionary authority to use and develop
an eclectic body of legal and interpretative principles may be used to create
a "common law" of e-commerce roughly along the lines of lex mercato-
ria.77 Like the common law, this arbitral body of law may, over time, in-
72 See infra section VIID.
73 Lanier, supra note 71, at 2, 6.
74 Vitek Danilowicz, The Choice of Applicable Law in International Arbitration, 9
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 237-239 (1986).75 JULIAN D. M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
STUDY IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARDS 102 (Kenneth R. Simmonds ed., 1978).76 Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Chal-
lenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 657, 687-88
(1999) ("an arbitrator can decide ex aequo et bono (according to equity, justice, and fair-
ness). Therefore, an arbitrator acting as amiable compositeur or deciding ex aequo et
bono may apply the lex mercatoria.").
77 "Lex mercatoria is a body of "spontaneous" law-law created by standard commercial
practices and arbitral decisions." Bernard Audit, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex
Mercatoria, at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/audit.html (last visited July 30,
2002). For a description of the development of lex mercatoria and the common law, see
Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, So. ECoN. J. 644 (Jan.
1989). Other commentators have addressed how this body of spontaneous law may arise in
the context of the Internet. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-- The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdic-
tion, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (2002); Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on
The Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211 (1997); Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Con-
flicts on The Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
75 (1996).
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corporate and develop principles of fairness.78
Arbitration may be either ad hoc or institutional. 79 Ad hoc arbitrations
require the parties or the arbitrator to create the procedure and administra-
tive apparatus to effectuate the arbitration. 80 Frequently, arbitrators con-
ducting an ad hoc arbitral proceeding will adopt the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. Institutional arbitration takes places under the auspices
of some arbitral institution, such as the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), American Arbitration Association, or the London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration. 81 The institution provides the administrative and logisti-
cal support to facilitate the arbitration82 and must be paid in addition to the
fee paid to the arbitrator.83 The institution also provides permissive default
rules, which the parties are free to vary by agreement and mandatory rules
that the parties may not change.84 Many institutions have different rules for
different types of disputes. 85 Since procedural rules may affect the outcome
or the enforceability of the award, sophisticated parties are careful in select-
ing an arbitral institution. Proper selection of an arbitral institution may
convey to a party advantages equivalent to those achieved through forum
shopping or judge shopping.86 The ability to choose the ODR provider may
convey an unfair advantage to the e-merchant. Policies that influence insti-
tutional ODR providers and grant them incentives to level the procedural
playing field are more effective than similar policies that only affect indi-
vidual arbitrators or individual disputes.
87
78 For example, a just cause termination clause in an employment contract is read by arbi-
trators to incorporate certain fundamental principles of process developed by arbitral author-
ity over the past 50 years prior to termination. See, e.g., McCartney's Inc., 84 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 799, 804 (1985); See Federated Dept. Stores v. United Food and Commercial Work-
ers Union, Local 1442, 901 F.2d 1494 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding arbitrator did not go beyond
essence of collective bargaining agreement in determining due process to be component of
issue of good cause for discharge).
79 BORN, supra note 66, at 9.
80 LEW, supra 75, at 32-34.
8 BORN, supra note 66, at 9-10.
82 1d. at 10.
83 Id.
14 Id. at 45-46.
85 Id. at 14-15 (summarizing the methods used by the American Arbitration Association
and the London Court of International Arbitration).86 See generally Filip De Ly, The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 48 (1991) (discussing considerations in choosing a place for the arbitration).
8 See Peter Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the
Internet, 32 INT'L LAW. 991, 1019-1022 (1998) (suggesting that government legal regulation
against "mice," small entities that open and close at will in response to regulatory efforts,
will be ineffective so the regulatory focus should be on the larger more visible institutions,
the "elephants").
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 23:1 (2002)
VI. MARKET INCENTIVES AND PRIVATE SOLUTIONS
Because judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely limited and
deferential, the focus should be on processes that lead to a fair and just
award rather than processes that correct error when a party seeks judicial
enforcement of an arbitral award. The Federal Arbitration Act, the Uniform
Arbitration Act, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Ar-
bitration, and New York Convention are designed to promote arbitration by
encouraging fast and inexpensive judicial orders reducing the arbitral award
to a court judgment. One possible way to encourage ODR providers and
arbitral tribunals to create processes that support due process and fair play
is to establish voluntary guidelines for consumer arbitration. Consumer
groups may be encouraged to create more competition in the market for
ODR services. Governments may ensure that trustmarks 88 are symbols of
reliability and fairness in ODR.89 Finally, as a matter of sound public pol-
icy when courts are petitioned to reduce an arbitration award to a court
judgment, the resulting judgment should embody an award that comports
with due process and fair play. For example, when a party requests a court
to enforce an arbitral award, the reviewing court cannot automatically grant
a deferential standard of review unless the arbitral process falls within the
voluntary safe harbor provisions of the government guidelines.
90
A. Due Process and Fair Play in an International E-Consumer Context
Articulating a standard for "due process" or "fair play" in a global e-
commerce market is at best problematic. "[D]ue process, unlike some legal
88
Seals of approval or 'trustmarks' are currently a chief mechanism of promoting self-regulation and
consumer confidence in electronic commerce. An increasing number of private organizations (Code
Owners) are promulgating e-commerce standards and Codes of Conduct and then certifying that
online businesses (Code Subscribers) have qualified and/or agreed to abide by the Code. Accredited
Subscribers are licensed to display the trustmark on their web site, which is expected to improve
consumer confidence.
Alan Wiener, Regulations and Standards for Online Dispute Resolution: A Summary of Pub-
lic and Private Initiatives, at http://mediate.com/articles/awiener.cfm.
89 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN
Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 191, 230 (2002) ("some en-
tity-like a government agency-will need to monitor the provider to see that the alleged
standards are acceptable and are being enforced."); Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer
Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute
Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 491
(2002).
90 Further under new theories of arbitration as state action, there may be a constitutional
requirement that courts assure themselves that the procedures used to procure the award
meet a minimum level of process. See Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Towards a State
Action Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 615-629 (1997).
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rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances[,]" 91 rather, "due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. 92 This ar-
ticle will conceptualize criteria for due process in the context of the major
e-commerce trading nations, including: Australia, Canada, the member
states of the European Union, Japan, and the United States.
The OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Elec-
tronic Commerce represent a consensus among the major e-commerce
global trading nations as to a floor on the rights of e-consumers to alterna-
tive dispute resolution. 93 Further, G-8 in the Okinawa Charter on Global In-
formation Society endorsed the OECD Guidelines.9 4 The OECD
Guidelines recommend:
[i]n considering whether to modify the existing framework, governments
should seek to ensure that the framework provides fairness to consumers and
business, facilitates electronic commerce, results in consumers having a level
of protection not less than that afforded in other forms of commerce, and pro-
vides consumers with meaningful access to fair and timely dispute resolution
and redress without undue cost or burden.95 [The alternative dispute resolution
provider must also] establish fair, effective and transparent internal mecha-
nisms to address and respond to consumer complaints and difficulties in a fair
and timely manner...
91 Cafeteria & Rest.Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
92 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
93 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for
Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce; Frequently Asked Questions,
at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/Moooo14340.pdf (last visited November 10, 2002) ("OECD is
an intergovernmental organization comprised of 29 Member countries, drawn from the
world's main developed democracies. The organization provides a forum for governments
to discuss economic and social policy in an effort to facilitate economic growth, jobs, trade
and development.") (The following 29 countries are members of the OECD: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Korea, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Tur-
key, Czech Republic, France, Hungry, Italy, Luxemburg, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and
the United States).
94 United States Embassy, Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, at
http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhg063.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2002) ("Promote
consumer trust in the electronic marketplace consistent with OECD guidelines and provide
equivalent consumer protection in the online world as in the offline world ... and explore
options to alleviate the difficulties faced by consumers in cross-border disputes, including
use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms..."). The G8 is an informal group of eight
developed democracies - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United King-
dom, and the United States.
95 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation Of The
OECD Council Concerning Guidelines For Consumer Protection In The Context Of Elec-
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Consumers are entitled, under this formulation of due process, to an alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanism in e-commerce that provides at least the
same protection that the consumer enjoys under the laws of the consumer's
domicile. The mechanism must be transparent, fair, efficient, and afford-
able to the consumer. Although the OECD Guidelines do not provide a
bright line test against which to measure due process, they do provide fac-
tors to determine due process.
Ultimately, the objective measure of due process is whether the con-
sumer receives the process and protection that he or she is entitled to as a
resident of a jurisdiction. The proper level is somewhere in between a real
world arbitration proceeding that may short circuit consumer rights and a
full-blown trial. If in the real world, this dispute would have been disposed
of through some summary proceeding, such as small claims court, then
small claims court is the level of process the consumer is entitled to in
ODR.
While the European Union's Recommendation on the Principles Appli-
cable to the Bodies Responsible for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer
Disputes is neither binding on member states nor does it specifically ad-
dress e-commerce, 97 it does provide useful guidance on key principles to
govern the resolution of online consumer disputes. The European Union
established seven core principles for entities supervising out-of-court set-
tlement. 98 These principles flesh out the bare recommendations of the
OECD. 99
The first principle is that the decision-maker must be both independent
and possess the technical competence to resolve the dispute.100 The arbitra-
tor should possess the requisite knowledge, experience, and training to
properly handle the proceeding, to understand the proceeding, to evaluate
the evidence, and to reach a principled decision. The arbitrator should be
97 Commission Recommendation on the Principles Applicable to the Bodies Responsible
for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers
/policy/developments/acce.just/acce.just02.en.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
98 Similarly, in the United States there is the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics
and Standards in ADR, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations (2002) (describing best
practices and baseline procedures for organizations administering ODR programs). CPR-
Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Principles for ADR Provider Or-
ganizations (2002), at http://www.cpradr.org/finalProvider.pdf. (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
This article focuses on the European Commission's Recommendations in order to place due
process concerns and their solution in a transnational context.
99 Commission Recommendation, supra note 97; Recommendation on the Principles for
Out-Of-Court Bodies Involved in the Consensual Resolution of Consumer Disputes, at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments /accejust/ acce.just 12_en.pdf (last
visited Nov. 8, 2002).100 Id.
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appointed for a term sufficiently long to permit a fair hearing and should
not be removed except for cause or upon agreement of the parties. Finally,
the arbitrator should not have a prior relationship with either party that may
call her independence into question.
The second principle is that the process be transparent. Information
regarding the scope of the arbitration services should be readily available.
This would include information regarding procedural, subject matter,
amount in controversy or territorial limitations on where the arbitral ser-
vices may be rendered. Such limitations may also include whether the par-
ties would be permitted to physically appear before the arbitrator, which
language(s) would be used in the proceeding, processes governing the sub-
mission of evidence, costs of the proceeding, types of rules, principles, or
codes of conduct that the arbitrator may apply, and the legal force and ef-
fect, if any, of the arbitral award. The ODR provider administering the ar-
bitration should publish at least an annual summary of arbitral decisions.
The better practice would be to publish complete awards only redacting in-
formation where there is a substantial privacy interest by one of the parties.
The third principle is that all parties be permitted to present their view-
points and evidence before the decision maker.1 '
The fourth principle is that:
[T]he effectiveness of the procedure is ensured through measures guaranteeing
that the consumer has access to the procedure without being [obligated] to use
a legal representative; that the procedure is free of charges or of moderate
costs; that only short periods elapse between the referral of a matter and the
decision; and that the competent body is given an active role, thus enabling it
to take into consideration any factors conducive to a settlement of the dis-
pute. 102
The fourth principle ensures that consumers or small merchants may par-
ticipate in the arbitration without undue expense or delay. In many con-
sumer disputes, the costs of arbitration may exceed the value of the dispute.
Attorney fees may also make the process unaffordable. Inordinate or un-
necessary delays may wear the weaker party down to the point of settling or
surrendering either out of frustration or need. The fourth principle permits
the role of the neutral to change from the common law referee model to the
civil law inquisitional model, depending on the circumstances of the arbitra-
tion.
The fifth principle is that:
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of the protection afforded by the mandatory provisions of the law of the State
in whose territory the body is established. In the case of cross-border disputes,
the decision taken by the body may not result in the consumer being deprived
of the protection afforded by the mandatory provisions applying under the law
of the Member State in which he is normally resident.
0 3
The fifth principle insures that consumer expectations, built on real world
commercial experience, will carry over into e-commerce. E-merchants
should not be able to use either mass market contracts or arbitration to frus-
trate the consumer protection legislation of the consumer's place of resi-
dence nor should they be able to gain an unfair advantage over legitimate
brick and mortar businesses by escaping the costs of consumer protection
legislation.
The sixth principle is that "[t]he decision taken by the body concerned
may be binding on the parties only if they were informed of its binding na-
ture in advance and specifically accepted this."' 0 4 Under the European Un-
ion's principles, pre-dispute binding arbitration is discouraged because it
has the effect of denying the consumer her day in court. A fair ODR proc-
ess should alleviate many of the criticisms of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses.
The seventh and final principle is that "[t]he procedure does not de-
prive the parties of the right to be represented or assisted by a third party at
all stages of the procedure."' 10 5 Depending on the level of the sophistication
of the parties, complexity of the issues surrounding the dispute, and the
procedural rules of the ODR provider, either the consumer or the merchant
may need the assistance of a non-party to properly prepare for the arbitra-
tion or to adequately present evidence to the arbitrator. Lay people are of-
ten unaware of which "facts" and evidence are legally significant or how to
best present their case to the arbitral tribunal.
The European Union's recommendations are an excellent starting point
for creating safe harbor provisions for B2C ODR.10 6 Due process is a flexi-
103 id.
104 Commission Recommendation, supra note 97.
105 Id.
106 These recommendations are in keeping with the general international agreement on
due process principles to govern ODR. The Australian Government commented that "As yet
there are no agreed international principles governing B2C ADR .... [Yet e]xamination of
various international standards for business to consumer alternative dispute resolution re-
veals that there is much in common between the standards and little conflict, notwithstanding
the terminology differs." Consumer Affairs Division, The Treasury, Dispute Resolution in
Electronic Commerce (Oct. 2001), at http://www.e-commerce.treasury.
gov.au/publications/DisputeResolutioninElectronicCommerceDiscussionPaper/dispute.pdf
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003). Cf
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ble concept, but there must be an absolute floor for the minimal level of
process that each disputant is entitled to receive if the dispute is to receive
safe harbor protection. Parties are free to establish higher levels of protec-
tion that are commensurate with the needs of higher value disputes or lower
levels of protection between knowledgeable and sophisticated parties. Even
with due process, at a certain point the law of diminishing returns sets in
and additional levels of processes merely become additional levels of soph-
istry, to ensnare the unwary consumer.
B. Existing Arbitral Incentive
ODR has not yet adopted definitions for due process and fair play, 0 7
largely because due process and fair play have costs and no corresponding
economic reward for the e-merchant or arbitral institution. 108 "It is easy to
The CPR-Georgetown Provider Principles state that provider organizations have responsibilities to:
ensure the quality and competence of those ADR neutrals (such as arbitrators) that appear on their
lists or are referred to parties for service; provide accurate and complete information about the ser-
vices provided; take reasonable steps to make services available to low-income parties; disclose all
appropriate conflicts of interests; make available a grievance or complaint mechanism about the ser-
vices offered; require neutrals to adhere to a reputable internal or external ethics code; avoid making
false or misleading statements about services provided; take appropriate steps to ensure confidential-
ity of processes as agreed to by parties or required by contractual provisions or law; and ensure that
services that are provided are done so in a "fundamentally fair and impartial manner." The Provider
Principles also recognize that obligations under these principles may vary with the degree of knowl-
edge and sophistication on the part of parties that actively and thoroughly screen and select particu-
lar neutrals.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42, at 966. The principles are very similar to the European
Commission's Recommendations on Out of Court Settlement.
107 To be a bit more precise, there are existing consumer due process protocols, but they
seem honored more in the breach than in their enforcement and are not as pervasive in ODR.
For examples of voluntary consumer ADR protocols, see AAA's Consumer Due Process
Protocol, at http://www.adr.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2003); JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbi-
trations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses, at http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer arb std.asp
(last visited Feb. 6, 2003). Further, should the ADR provider specified in the arbitration
agreement decline to resolve a dispute because the process falls below its consumer due
process protocol standard, courts simply order the parties to arbitrate before a provider with
different ethical standards rather than finding the agreement to arbitrate to be unconscion-
able. See Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 232 n. 42 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 915 (1997). In ordering parties to arbitrate under these circumstances,
courts merely facilitate a race to the statutory floor for due process in consumer arbitrations.
This purpose of this article is to suggest methods of putting teeth into voluntary compliance
regimes.
108
The strongest case for review of arbitration awards arises when there is a possibility that awards will
violate "mandatory rules," that is, laws that parties are not permitted to contract around.... Arbitra-
tors have no incentive to enforce these laws. Indeed, parties will usually want to circumvent them,
and arbitrators will enhance their market value by denying application of these laws when the disap-
pointed party tries to enforce them after a dispute arises. The need to maintain these laws against the
incentives of parties and arbitrators to violate them provides a strong case for judicial review.
Am. Soc. Of Int'l L. Proc., supra note 65, at 126.-27.
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insist upon 'due process' in consumer arbitration, indeed 'due process' is as
widely-cherished as 'mom and apple pie,' but the hard thinking begins
when one asks who pays the price of process and how much they pay.'
10 9
Typically, the consumer discovers at the time the e-commerce dispute arises
that he or she, as part of a mass-market consumer contract, entered into a
pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising from the transaction.
The dispute must be resolved under the rules of some arbitral institution se-
lected by the e-merchant. These consumer agreements frequently take the
form of "click wrap" contracts or terms buried on the merchant's webpage
accessible only through a hyperlink." 0 These consumer contracts can best
be characterized as contracts of adhesion in which the consumer is "disad-
vantaged by relative ignorance of the implications of the [arbitration
clause], and of the likelihood and nature of a future legal dispute in which
the [arbitration clause] would be invoked."'I I
Arbitration clauses are largely irrelevant to the average consumer's
life-experience 1 2 and "are in substance, immaterial to the course of the
transaction, which would typically center on price. ... They thus receive
little attention from the [consumer]." ' 1 3 Even if the consumer is aware of
the arbitration clause, he or she is unlikely to possess adequate information
to assess the relative costs and benefits of waiving a judicial forum in ex-
change for a proceeding before an arbitrator.114 Informed consumers are
likely to discount arbitration as an improbable event and are, therefore,
unlikely to undertake the efforts or costs to research the implications of se-
109 Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbi-
tration Agreements, 2001 J. DIsp. RESOL. 89, 99-100 (2001).
110 Speidel, supra note 54, at 1072.
[T]he owner of a Web site risks alienating virtual visitors if she forces them first to view all of the
legal information that a cautious lawyer might recommend. Site designers.., are also aware that the
potential purchaser might not spend the extra time to scroll or 'click' through screens full of dis-
claimers or other pertinent terms.
Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web Sites and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1283-84 (1997).
"11 David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 55
(1997).
112 Haagen, supra note 40, at 1059-60 ("While people may have strong views about the
relative merits of various dispute resolution procedures after they have gone through them,
people are likely not to have very good understanding of what these procedures may entail
before they have experienced them.").
113 Schwartz, supra note I11, at 56-57; Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interven-
tions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 1909-1911 (2001); Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Con-
sumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of
Consumer Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841, 842 (1977).
114 Schwartz, supra note 111, at 57.
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lecting an arbitral forum.' 15 Furthermore, the consumer rarely has the op-
portunity to negotiate terms with the merchant." 6 Finally, because these
terms are in essence hidden or at least their economic effect under-
appreciated, merchants are able to offer a better deal on price or visible
terms while the consumer unknowingly gambles away choice of forum, cost
of forum, and available remedies, in the unlikely event that a dispute even-
tually arises.1 17 Therefore, they are unable to give the arbitration clause a
market value.
"Market choice activation of the 'invisible hand' requires transparency.
Consumers cannot choose x unless they can tell when x is or is not part of
the offer."' 18 Market failure justifies government intervention. The provi-
sion of ODR services represents a market failure because consumers lack
sufficient information to properly value the choice of methods of dispute
resolution." 9 Correspondingly, the issue of whether there is an adequate or
even any transfer of "consideration" to compensate the consumer for sur-
rendering a valuable legal right is hotly debated.120 There may be counter-
vailing market forces that will protect the e-consumer's interest in a fair
arbitration process. Some commentators contend that the reputational sanc-
tion serves to adequately address the unfairness in consumer arbitration. 21
Arbitral institutions have strong reputational incentives to respect due proc-
ess and fair play.122 The parties have a strong interest in an enforceable
award, and the more tilted the playing field, the less likely the enforcement
of the award.12 3 Theoretically, e-merchants are unlikely to choose ODR
providers with poor reputations for fairness because courts are less likely to
115 Id
1161Id
118 Pollack, supra note 15, at 670.
.9 See Haagen, supra note 40, at 1059-60; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 48, 235 (2d ed. 1997) (Each decision maker should have "full information about
the nature and consequences of his choice.").
120 Drahozal, supra note 47, at 765-66 nn.441-444; but see, e.g., Stiles v. Home Cable
Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (lowering consumer credit card interest
rate from 18.96% to 16.96% if consumer agrees to arbitration); contra Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.
Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (questioning whether there was a quid pro quo for consumers
waiving their right to bring a class action suit under an arbitration clause).
121 Drahozal, supra note 47, at 768-71. But see Thomas N. Hubbard, How do Consumers
Motivate Experts? Reputational Incentives in an Auto Repair Market, 45 J. L & ECON. 437,
437-388 (2002) ("Although there is some sense that reputation is important in expert-service
markets, how it works and the key institutions that support it are not well understood.").
There is a growing body of research in the area evaluating reputation as a constraint or moti-
vation force in online relationships of reputation studies. The literature should be explored
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enforce awards administered by ODR providers with poor reputations and
because the merchant may suffer some reputational sanctions in the relevant
online business community. 1
24
Reputation is most effective in controlling behavior when the parties
have repeat dealings with each other.
125
Reputation is likely to be less effective in one-time consumer transactions, par-
ticularly if consumers are isolated and seller can readily discriminate between
sophisticated and unsophisticated buyers. It is transactions such as these that
have the greatest potential for abusive use of arbitration clauses ... and are the
ones in which judicial or legislative intervention has the strongest justifica-
tion.1
21
An anonymous e-consumer with a series of one-time transactions with
different e-merchants best describes the e-marketplace. The consumer's re-
lationship both to the merchant who selects the ODR provider and with the
ODR provider is that of a one-time player. Reputation is unlikely to be an
efficient constraint on the process. Even small merchant-consumers, who
may have some relationship with the ODR provider, are unlikely to have an
124 Posner, supra note 65, at 128 (If arbitrators care about their reputation and routinely
ignore mandatory rules they will loose their business.) For a general theoretical discussion
of role of reputation see generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market
Forces in Assuring Contractual Perfomance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981); Steven Tadelis,
What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 548 (1999); but see
Thomas N. Hubbard, supra note 121, at 437-438 ("Theoretical models show that demand-
side quality incentives can be weak in expert-service markets. [T]hese models have led aca-
demics and policy makers to suspect market failure .... ").
125 Drahozal, supra note 47, at 768-71. The Internet may be used to mitigate information
asymmetry. See Alan Wiener, Opportunities and Initiatives In Online Dispute Resolution, at
http://mediate.com/articles/awienerl.cfm (last visited on Nov. 8, 2002) (discussing programs
such as I-level and I-courthouse which permit consumers to publicize their disputes, certifi-
cation and trustmarks, and of course, the perennially favorite,
"your company ripped me off and sucks.com" sites where consumers vent their disagree-
ments). See, e.g., Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D.
Va. 2000); Robert A. Badgley, Internet Domain Names and ICANN Arbitration: The Emerg-
ing "Law" of Domain Name Custody Disputes, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 343, 360-368 (2002).
But, as an early study concluded "even the existence of perfect communication among buy-
ers so that all future sales are lost to a cheating firm is not sufficient to assure noncheating
behavior." Klein & Leffler, supra note 124, at 633 (emphasis added).
126 Drahozal, supra note 47, at 769 (emphasis added). Internet technology is already used
to "discriminate" among consumers. Technologies such as cookies allow merchants to offer
different prices to consumers based on pre-determined characteristics. These same tech-
nologies may permit merchants to offer different ODR terms to different consumers. Con-
sumers viewed by the merchants as less sophisticated or less able to challenge terms may be
subject to more onerous ODR agreements. See, e.g., Andrew G. Celli, Jr. & Kenneth M.
Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge: Surveying the Digital Divide, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 53, 66-69 & nn.78-90 (2002) (discussing and providing e-commerce examples of e-
commerce price-discrimination).
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individual relationship with the arbitrator. For example, a major bank may
have thousands of delinquent credit card debts that are processed by an
ODR provider and then adjudicated by a handful of individual arbitrators.
But, a small business may have several arbitrations per year and is unlikely
to use the same arbitrator twice. The consumer may only have one arbitra-
tion in a lifetime. The largest e-commerce merchants may have sufficient
disputes to develop on-going relationships with individual arbitrators.
These repeat relationships are the significant relationships for reputational
motivation. Because reputational sanctions on merchants or individual ar-
bitrators may be attenuated or non-existent in e-commerce, 27 consumers
may have to rely on the reputation of the arbitral institution to ensure due
process and fair play.128 However, institutional arbitration is not an unmiti-
gated good; arbitral institutions may aggregate the effects of market forces
without the corresponding ameliorative effects of individual responsibil-
ity.
12 9
There is anecdotal evidence that provider reputation may not ade-
quately protect consumer interests in fair dispute resolution.1 30 There is
also empirical evidence in the context of the ICANN's Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Policy ("UDRP"). The UDRP is the process under which
most Internet domain name disputes are resolved.' 31 While the UDRP is
distinguishable from the existing B2C dispute resolution paradigm analyzed
in this article, the UDRP does have significant similarities with the existing
127 See Nader, supra note 52, at 1000-01 ("In a modern industrialized society dominated
by large corporations and sprawling governmental bureaucracies, public opinion and inter-
personal ties can no longer serve as effective mechanisms of social control."); Chrysanthos
Dellarocas, Goodwill Hunting: An Economically Efficient Online Feedback Mechanism for
Environments with Variable Product Quality, at http://ccs.mit.edu/dell/goodwill%20hunt-
ing.pdf (demonstrating inherent weaknessed in online feedback mechanisms particularly
where the "goods" are of variable quality and suggesting an alternative model).
128 Drahozal, supra note 47, at 769.
129 Cf Hubbard, supra note 121, at 464.
130 For example, if ADR provider reputation is insufficient to restrain the appearance of
arbitral overreaching in the real world, it is unlikely to do so in ODR. See Paul Wenske,
Some Cardholders are Signing Away Their Right to Sue, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (Apr. 30,
2000), available at http://www.kcstar.com/projects/carddebt/2side.htm (for example a credit
card issuer won 99.6 percent of the 19,705 consumer disputes that it sent to arbitration over
the past two years).
31 Domain name disputes are frequently between trademark holders and individual regis-
trants of domain names. For example, who has superior right to the domain name McDon-
ald.com, McDonalds the fast food franchise, the Clan McDonald of Scotland, or Jane Doe,
the cyber-squatter (cyber-entrepreneur), who registered the domain name first thus staking
out her territory? The UDRP is the administrative process that resolves these disputes. See
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
policy-24oct99.htm; Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm.
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B2C dispute paradigm. Under both regimes, one party has the exclusive
opportunity to select the ODR provider, thus permitting a party to manipu-
late the ODR system.1 32 Unlike the existing B2C ODR process, the UDRP
process is transparent in that all decisions are published and available on the
World Wide Web, 33 biographic and other information is available for indi-
vidual panelists. Additionally, UDRP was the result of an aggressively ne-
gotiated, bargained for process at which all the relevant constituencies had
the opportunity to participate. 134 Finally, an award under the UDRP may be
challenged de novo in a court of competent jurisdiction.1 35 Existing B2C
ODR has none of these ameliorative characteristics. Accordingly, existing
B2C ODR is likely to be even less consumer friendly than dispute resolu-
tion under the UDRP.
As one commentator noted in a comprehensive study of decisions un-
der the UDRP:
Simply put, complainants win more frequently with WIPO and the NAF than
with e-Resolution. The statistical data, which has remained consistent since
the introduction of the UDRP, shows that complainants win 82.2% of the time
with the WIPO, 82.9% of the time with the NAF, but only 63.4% of the time
with e-Resolution. Since outcome is what matters most to complainants, they
have rewarded WIPO and the NAF with an overwhelming share of the UDRP
caseload. Despite the highest fees, neutral rules, and low-key marketing,
WIPO commands 58% of the UDRP caseload, compared with 34% for the
NAF and a paltry 7% for e-Resolution.
36
The data shows that when providers control who decides a case-which they
do for all single panel cases--complainants win just over 83 percent of the
time. When provider influence over panelists diminishes-which occurs in
three-member panel cases since in these cases both the complainant and re-
spondent choose one of the panelists as well as exercise some influence over
the choice of the third member of the panel -- the complainant winning per-
132 Although it appears there is no empirical research, anecdotal evidence suggests that
under the UDRP trademark holders tend to be more sophisticated and have access to superior
resources in comparison to domain name registrants.
133 Search Index of Proceedings Under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/cgi-bin/udrp/udrp.cgi.134 Historical Background on the UDRP, at http://www.udrplaw.net/udrphistory.htm (up-
dated Dec. 27, 2002).
135 Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2001); Bord v.
Banco de Chile, 205 F.Supp.2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2002); Parisi v. Netleaming, Inc., 139 F.
Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001); see Stephen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the
Arbitration Law Context: Consent to, and Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL AND EMERG.
Bus. L. 129, 161-62 (2002) ("Courts review UDRP arbitration de novo. This is the most rig-
orous, least deferential, standard of review possible. This is in stark contrast to the no-rigor,
extremely deferential, standard of review courts give to arbitration under the FAA.").136 Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness
in the ICANN UDRP, at http://aix 1 .uottawa.ca/-geist/geistudrp.pdf.
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centage drops to 60 percent.... As of July 7, 2001, an astonishing 53% of all
NAF single panel cases-512 of 966-were decided by only six people. The
complainant winning percentage in those cases was an astounding 94%. Al-
though respondents failed to respond in some of those cases, the skewed
caseload is unique to the NAF with neither WIPO nor e-Resolution presenting
a similar caseload imbalance.1
37
Clearly, at least in the UDRP context, the reputation of the ODR pro-
vider may not be sufficient to deter either arbitral over-reaching or the per-
ception of a pro-complainant bias in ODR. There are sufficient systemic
market similarities between domain name dispute resolution and B2C ODR
in other contexts to suggest that the UDRP model predicts the failure of the
existing B2C ODR paradigm to provide fair ODR services.
The strongest arguments for a market driven approach assume that re-
putational sanctions would be sufficient to provide a fair market for ODR
services. 138Although these market forces may function in theory, consider-
ing the extremely deferential standard of review given to arbitral award un-
der existing law, it is unlikely, except in the most blatantly egregious cases,
that a court would ever reach the question of bias. 3 9 Further, at the margin,
the merchant who selects the arbitral institution will not require a guarantee
of winning individual disputes, just a small percentage in his or her favor
over numerous disputes may be sufficient to justify future business to the
arbitral institution and arbitrator. 40 This subtle bias in ODR services may
137 Id.
138 Drahozal, supra note 47, at 771-72 ("arbitration institutions have strong incentives to
promote the fairness of the arbitral process"); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Pri-
vate Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2421, 2457 (2000) ("Those
with reputations for fairly arbitrating disputes between buyers and sellers will see their busi-
ness row and their profits increase.").
Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity: the Elusive Quest for Justice in Tri-
partite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 749, 766 (1995) (citing Health Services Mgmt.
v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992)) ("A relationship between the arbitrator and
the party or its representatives is unlikely to be the source of vacation of an award unless the
alliance is out of the ordinary course of business and is so 'intimate-personally, socially,
professionally, or financially-as to cast serious doubt' on the arbitrator's impartiality.").
140 Cf
From the perspective of some parties and arbitrators, this leads to "compromise" awards in which
arbitrators are accused of "splitting the baby" to keep both parties reasonably happy (or equally un-
happy), and prevents more definitive rulings when those are actually more accurate or "just." To the
extent that arbitrators sufficiently "please" their clients to be chosen again, a different ethical con-
cern arises in the possibility that a "repeat player" effect occurs when one kind of party (such as an
employer, major institution, large corporation, or high volume merchant) often uses arbitration (and
particular arbitrators) more often than the other side (one-shot litigants, such as consumers, securities
purchasers, patients) and knows how to "play" or "work" the system (whether the process itself, or
the particular arbitrator).
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42, at 955; see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Ar-
bitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Em-
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only be proven over numerous cases using complex statistical analysis.
Most B2C ODR would not justify the expense of conducting a study to de-
termine systemic bias. Even if there was funding to support such a study,
most commercial arbitration awards are unpublished, the arbitrator does not
provide a reasoned opinion, and there may not be sufficient factual similari-
ties among the cases to permit statistical analysis. Consequently, there may
be insufficient data to undertake this sort of study in order to prove or dis-
prove market incentive theories that reputation can provide a level playing
field.
C. New Arbitral Incentive
Since current market incentives and existing legal safeguards are in-
adequate in online consumer arbitration,141 governments should promote an
environment that supports consumer confidence in ODR by providing or
encouraging market incentives that minimize the intrusion of regulation and
respect party autonomy. Formal affirmative governmental regulation of
ODR may result in placing conflicting, inconsistent requirements on ODR
providers. 42 In addition, governmental regulation tends to lag significantly
behind technological change and is unlikely to keep pace with evolving e-
commerce technology and business methods. 143 Consequently, this article
proposes a hybrid approach similar to the current United States Federal
Trade Commission's approach to e-commerce regulation 144 or the Com-
monwealth of Australia's best practices model 45 both of which demand
leadership from government, recommend that government promote dia-
logue among the stakeholders, aggressively enforce existing laws and con-
sumer protection regulations, and provide incentives for good consumer
practices; all without imposing new legal mandates on arbitral providers.
1. Trustmarks for ODR Providers
Governments or private parties could establish certification that a site
ployers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 478-79 (1996).
141 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 119, at 48 ("severe asymmetries [in information] can dis-
rupt markets so much that a social optimum cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange.
When that happens, government intervention in the market can correct for the informational
asymmetries and induce more nearly optimal exchange.").
142 See Swire, supra note 87, at 991 ("The unique nature of the Internet highlights the
likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even out-
right inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was
unaware were being accessed.").
143 Pollack, supra note 15, at 659.
144 See id. at 656-59.
145 Wiener, supra note 1, at Part 1; UN/CEFACT, supra note 15, at 12 ("The promotion
and implementation of ODR can be done especially in combination with self-regulatory in-
struments for electronic business such as codes of conduct and trust-mark schemes,")
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is "consumer fair" by using "trustmarks."' 146 Potentially, trustmarks would
raise consumer awareness on arbitral issues and lower the consumer's
transaction cost to learn the e-merchant's online dispute resolution pol-
icy. 147 E-merchants or ODR providers without a seal of approval would
suffer reputational sanctions. 148
The trustmark program is similar to the existing certification mark pro-
grams that consumers already rely on 149 [e.g., Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval, Underwriters Laboratory (UL), or the Better Business Bureau
("BBB")]. To obtain a certification mark, the e-merchant applies to the en-
tity or certifying authority15° and agrees to comply with the certifying au-
146 American Bar Association Task Force on E-commerce & Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Draft Preliminary Report & Concept Paper 5-10 (May 2001), at
http://www.law.washington.edu/ABA-eADR/drafts/docs/2001.05.21 draft.doc. Professor
Catherine Kessedjian, Deputy Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law,
proposed to start with a process of site-certification along the lines of the work done within the
[ICC] and other private organizations. This certification process should include minimum substan-
tive rules of protection for the consumer including warranties, and a fair and easy dispute resolution
mechanism which could possibly be free of charge to the consumer. When a site has obtained the
certification label, it could provide for the application of the law of the country of origin and for the
courts of that country for the residual cases which could not be solved by the dispute resolution
mechanism part of the certification. If a site has not been certified, then the law and the courts of the
consumer's location would be competent.
Id. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Geneva Round Table on Electronic
Commerce and Private International Law (Oct. 25, 2000), at
http://www.hcch.net/e/events/press0 e.html (last visited July 29, 2002).
47 See Erik Dubrin, McDonald's or the Michelin Guide? Revealing Quality Through Pri-
vate Sector Certification, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, at
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1097.pdf (discussing and modeling the role of certifica-
tion intermediaries).
148 Ponte, supra note 5, at 87-88 ("ODR trustmark programs could provide consumers
with a level of confidence about their ODR provider regarding basic standards of quality and
fairness. Providers failing to live up to these standards would lose their trustmark certifica-
tion, a clear signal to online consumers about the quality and reputation of an ODR pro-
vider."); see generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in
Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1999) (establishing the basic paradigm for third-
party facilitiation in e-commerce).
149 Some of the better known online trustmarks are BBBOnline, BetterWeb, Casetrust,
CommerceTrust, Clicksure, IMRG Hallmark, JADMA seal, Labelsite, Ladybird, PublicEye,
Safemall, TrustUK, and SquareTrade. See Caslon Analytics Profile: Trustmarks, at
http://www.caslon.com.au/trustmarksprofile.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). Two of these
trustmarks are of particular interest. SquareTrade is the trustmark of an ODR provider. See
SquareTrade, at http://www.squaretrade.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2003). Trustuk is endorsed
by the government of the United Kingdom. See TrustUK, at http://www.trustuk.org.uk/
default.asp?option=7 (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
150 See The GBDe Trustmarks Working, Recommendations and Guidelines Presented by
the Working Group at the GBDe 2000 Miami Conference, at http:// consumerconfi-
dence.gbde.org/trust-rec.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003) (for an excellent overview and
analysis of trustmarks).
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thority's code of conduct. The e-merchant then displays the trustmark on
its Web page so the consumer knows that the e-merchant complies with
some behavioral standard or code of conduct. The customer may click on
the trustmark symbol to go to the certifying authority's website to learn
more about the e-merchant or code of conduct. If the e-merchant fails to
comply with the code of conduct, then the consumer may complain to the
certifying authority. Additionally, the certifying authority will have a
clearly defined procedure in place to handle disputes between the consumer
and the e-merchant. E-merchants who do not cooperate with the certifying
authority to resolve consumer disputes or who fail to comply with the certi-
fying authority's code of conduct may have their right to use the trustmark
revoked and thereby suffer reputational sanctions.
To further ensure compliance standards, the certifying authority may
monitor the e-merchant for current and continual compliance with its code
of conduct. Therefore, the first line of defense in this process is the certify-
ing authority's use of the trustmark. In order to maintain the reputation of
the trustmark and in order to maintain the legal authority to issue a trust-
mark, the certifying authority must enforce the rules under which the trust-
mark was issued to the e-merchant. This provides governments and their
courts a "stick" to back up the "carrot" of self-regulation for existing con-
sumer protection legislation, which can then be used to assure that e-
merchants and ODR providers comply with the terms of the certifying au-
thority, posted policies, and regulations.15' While this posits a voluntary
regulatory regime, once an e-merchant or the ODR provider adopts these
policies, failure to comply with them is either a breach of contract or an un-
fair and deceptive trade practice. 52 Either ground may permit government
intervention. Finally, industry and ODR providers should want to demon-
strate that self-regulation, voluntary regulation, or government leadership is
insufficient to provide effective, inexpensive, and fair ODR because the al-
ternative will be affirmative government regulation.
Unfortunately, private trustmarks have not lived up to their potential.
Very few entities are members of trustmark regimes. Those entities that are
members often do not post the trustmark or post it in an inconspicuous
place on the website. The seal of the certifying trustmark authority lacks
'In the Matter of Geocities, File No. 9823015, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/
geo-ord.htm; see Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2058 (2000) ("By encouraging websites to provide privacy policies in
the first place, the FTC has created a situation in which it is now able to extend its enforce-
mentjurisdiction onto the Internet.").
152United States Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, at hap:!!
www.export.gov/safeharbor/shoverview.html ("Private sector self regulation and enforce-
ment will be backed up as needed by government enforcement of the federal and state unfair
and deceptive statutes.").
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reputational power.153 The remedies for violating the membership terms are
inadequate. Finally, the general requirements of most certifying authorities
to obtain a trustmark are well below reasonable consumer expectations for
ethical business practices. Nonetheless, the aggressive use of governmental
or quasi-governmental authority to establish trustmark providers may mini-
mize or solve much of the existing problems.
2. Consumer ODR Providers
Consumer organizations and non-profit business organizations may
serve as trusted intermediaries to resolve consumer disputes. One of the
pioneering providers of ADR services for consumer disputes is the Better
Business Bureau. The not-for-profit nature of the ODR provider would
minimize the economic incentives that may create a systemic bias in the or-
dering of the arbitral process. 154 Further, as a not for profit, the ODR pro-
vider could service the B2C market at a reduced rate and perhaps with
volunteer arbitrators to minimize the costs of arbitrating low dollar value
disputes. Volunteer arbitrators would have no incentive to call close cases
in favor of the repeat player in the hope of further business or further in-
formal social relations. While in theory this process has much to commend
it, as a practical matter, as long as the merchant chooses the ODR provider,
there would still be incentives to the non-profit to encourage merchants to
use their services or the ODR provider would become obsolete through
non-use assuming that the e-merchant continues to select the ODR provider
in consumer disputes.
3. Increased Judicial Review ofArbitral Awards
E-merchants add arbitration clauses to consumer contracts because
they perceive that arbitration is economically advantageous. Without ne-
gating the e-merchant's economic incentive to use ODR, there is a contin-
153 Pollack, supra note 15, at 690, 692-94. The concept of a trustmark is that consumers
will trust the seal organization even if they do not know the member company. Even the
best-known privacy trustmarks lack consumer confidence. See id. It is not clear that even
with substantial private investment to raise consumer awareness that this will change in the
context of ODR. It is unlikely that the reputational issue will change dramatically when
well-known brick and mortar providers such as the American Arbitration Association and
the Better Business Bureau move into ODR. See id. (discussing BBBonline in the privacy
context).
154 Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits From The Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and Public
Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731 (1994) (suggesting the de-
mand-side (consumer) interests in the control of not-for-profits may be inadequate to assure
adequate delivery of not for profit services). For example, not-for-profit ADR providers
may merely reallocate "profits" from stakeholders to its employees or other institutional
commitments and programs or consumer interests may play a second fiddle to the interests
of institutions and foundations providing funding to subsidize inexpensive consumer ODR.
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uum of changes that would improve the existent ODR paradigm, some of
which may add "costs." E-merchants should be willing to bear these costs
as long as the costs associated with arbitration remain less than those asso-
ciated with pursuing traditional litigation. This optimal point where the
cost of consumer due process equals or is less than the marginal cost of liti-
gation depends on the industry, type of good or service and its price, loca-
tion of the parties, and many other factors. 155
For an incentive model that focuses on arbitration to work, after adding
the costs associated with due process, arbitration must remain more afford-
able than litigation. 156 From the e-merchant's perspective, arbitration offers
many cost reducing advantages. Arbitration may reduce the risk of unpre-
dictable jury verdicts, including verdicts with inordinate punitive damage
awards. 157 Expert arbitrators may be better able than the courts to detect
substandard performance of contractual obligations, including those im-
posed by trade customs.158 Arbitrators may apply better rules than the de-
fault rules that a court must apply to the dispute.159 Parties may construct
an arbitral regime to encourage them to arbitrate the economically optimal
quantity and types of disputes.' 60 With these advantages, it is unlikely the
e-merchants will reject arbitration even if the arbitration award may be sub-
ject to the costs of some heightened standard of judicial review on the rare
circumstance that a party elects to challenge the arbitration award.161
155 Courts always recognize that, outside of a few de minimis generalized requirements,
one must define due process in a specific context and at a specific cost. Government regula-
tions are unlikely to be subtle enough to find the optimum regulatory point to protect con-
sumers and e-merchants across industries, technologies, and types of good or services
without imposing unnecessary economically inefficient burdens or adding unnecessary addi-
tional uncertainty to the arbitration process. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960)
("'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content
varies according to specific factual contexts.").
156 Shavell, supra note 40, at 6, n.8. Clearly, if state sponsored dispute resolution is
cheaper than private dispute resolution, all things being equal, participants will prefer state
sponsored dispute resolution. One thing that may not be equal is that some parties may be
willing to pay a significant premium for speed and privacy in the adjudication process or
neutral expertise in the subject matter of the dispute.
117 Id. at 5.
58 Id. at 6.
159 Id.
160 Id. For example, parties could contract for a strict liability standard if one party could
cure defects at a nominal cost or contract for a negligence standard if defects may be cured
only at an inordinate cost.
1 For example, despite that fact the decisions under the UDRP are freely reviewable in
state sponsored courts and often involve valuable intellectual property rights, only 25 of the
cases out of over the 3,000 that have been decided have been challenged in courts. See Eliza-
beth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 191,
224 & n. 137 (2002); cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alter-
native Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RES. 19, 61 &
n.178 (1999) ("parties may be content with an ability to be heard by a third person neutral if
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The best model would be that in which only arbitral awards that could
not be enforced under existing law would receive no judicial deference.
Awards that are otherwise enforceable would be subject to varying degrees
of judicial deference and review.' 62 If the model for non-binding arbitration
provides adequate incentives for the parties to arbitrate, then the even more
judicially deferential sliding scale of review recommended in this article is
also feasible. 163 The feasibility of this model will depend on how well arbi-
tration predicts the outcome of a party's attempt to challenge the award.
1 64
Non-binding arbitration has three possible predictive values-it can per-
fectly predict the trial outcome, imperfectly predict the trial outcome, or
have no predictive value.165 If non-binding arbitration perfectly predicts the
trial outcome, the parties will voluntarily arbitrate and accept the arbitration
award as a cost effective alternative to trial. 166 If non-binding arbitration is
an imperfect predictor of the trial outcome, the parties may choose to arbi-
if they are convinced that the process is otherwise fair").
62 This idea is not entirely novel. Professor Posner suggested that "[t]he normative ar-
gument is that courts should enforce mandatory rules randomly" and randomly review arbi-
tration awards to assure that the award complies with the mandatory law of the jurisdiction.
See Am. Socy' Int'l L. Proc, supra note 65, at 126-29. Of course, only reviewing awards
where at least one party is dissatisfied is a more efficient use of scarce judicial resources.
Absent collusion, parties are in the best positions to detect arbitral error.
163 See infra section VIL.B for a discussion of the UDRP, an example of an existing real-
world non-binding ADR model that functions without the sanction of judicial enforcement.
164 A number of the articles that try to model parties' use of ADR/litigation rely on cer-
tain assumptions that are problematic at best. For example, one writer posits that there are
three possible approaches in the decision to pursue ADR: 1) where ADR perfectly predicts
trial outcomes; 2) where ADR has no predictive value; and, 3) where ADR is an imperfect
predictor of trial outcomes. Shavell, supra note 40, at 13-19. Clearly, the first two options
have very little value in examining parties' decisions to pursue litigation after an arbitral de-
cision. Absolute certainty exists only as an abstraction, and as a matter of legal strategy,
provides no additional information; it is a simple binary approach without any uncertainty.
In contrast, the third possibility, that arbitral decisions provide imperfect information about
the outcome of future trials, reflects the uncertainty faced by all possible litigants. It is here
that further study should be focused. But some of the premises found in current research
should be revisited. For example, pareto optimality hardly seems appropriate when the ac-
tions of two legal opponents are under consideration. Next, the amount that would be won at
trial will vary according to the parties' different processes, imperfect information, and ex-
perience. And, litigation can never be seen as costless. All of these factors must be included
in any model that attempts to predict where a party elects to pursue litigation following an
"unsuccessful" outcome in ADR. Clearly, if a plaintiff or defendant loses at ADR and thinks
that this outcome was outside their respective probability, the questions should be: how good
was their assessment of their p-hat; were the p-hats reasonably close; and, is the payout so
large that they are willing to risk additional costs for an uncertain outcome. All of this can
best be modeled using conditional probability. Some of these components may be available
from the databases that track ADR. Future research should consider the information col-
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trate because it may produce information that leads to settlement based on
the arbitral process or arbitrator's decision.' 67 The third possibility is that
the arbitration will provide no information that leads to a settlement and
does not predict trial outcomes. If the non-binding arbitration provides no
information useful in predicting success at trial or in other ways placing a
settlement value, then the arbitration will merely absorb resources and the
parties will not arbitrate. 168 Because under the recommended model, courts
will give at least some deference to arbitral awards other than currently un-
enforceable ones, arbitration would be at a minimum an imperfect predictor
of outcome at trial. Considering that most arbitral awards will not be chal-
lenged in courts and those awards that fall within the safe harbor provisions
will receive various levels of deference, in the vast majority of challenges,
the arbitral award would be a perfect predictor of trial outcome.1
69
One can independently justify judicial review of arbitral awards as an
appellate correction measure. 70 State sponsored court review harmonizing
conflicting arbitral awards provides incentives for arbitrators to do their
best and legitimize the arbitral process because the award may be reviewed
by an additional, ostensibly neutral body.' 7' Further, arbitrators in the e-
commerce context may frequently be applying laws that no state-sponsored
court has yet had the opportunity to interpret. Judicial review then serves
an additional error correction function and a public law making function;
functions that may not otherwise take place if these disputes remain in the
private realm.' 72 This is in contrast to brick and mortar commerce where
167 Id. at 19; Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution, 53 U. Cri-. L. REv. 366, 372-74 (1986) (discussing summary jury tri-
als as providing information useful to predict trial outcome and settlement).
68 Shavell, supra note 40, at 18.
169 See generally Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995) [hereinafter Shavell 1I]. Because arbitration is a form of vol-
untary settlement, then the settlement literature may be instructive. In one study ofjudicially
reviewed settlements, the court approved 67% of the bankruptcy settlements, 84% of the
class action settlements, and 83% of the antitrust settlements. Sanford 1. Weisburst, Judicial
Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55,
72 tl999).
70 See generally Shavell 11, supra note 169. The settlement literature also suggests that
judicial review of arbitral awards is justified because "[t]he costs of a prolonged trial are
avoided by holding a less costly fairness hearing on the proposed settlement [arbitration
award], and the court's review assures that inadequately represented parties will not be in-
jured .... Weisburst, supra note 169, at 59.
171 Shavell II, supra note 169, at 425-26; cf Weisburst, supra note 169, at 66 ("The pri-
mary benefit of judicial review of settlements is that it protects inadequately represented in-
terests at the settlement negotiation stage, where those interests are especially vulnerable.").
172 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. C-I.
LEGAL. F. 19, 26-27 (1987) (commenting that "precedents exist principally to help people
conform their conduct to law" and that settlement (in our case arbitration) may result in the
creation of "too few precedents").
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arbitrators frequently follow well-trodden legal paths and apply known le-
gal principles to novel facts. In cyberspace, both the law and the facts may
be novel, and there is a need to create a common law based on both judicial
decisions and arbitral awards.
The current regulatory model for e-commerce is for governments to
provide leadership to encourage industry and consumer interest groups to
create voluntary e-commerce standards. Once industry voluntarily adopts
these standards, governments can then enforce the standards through "un-
fair and deceptive" trade practice laws that ensure compliance with the vol-
untary standards. 173 Governments can also act through moral persuasion,
with the ever-present threat of positive government regulation. The solu-
tion proposed in this article, in keeping with existing regulatory practice in
e-commerce, is that governments should encourage arbitral institutions to
adopt policies similar to the OECD Guidelines or the European Union's
Recommendations on Out of Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes. If
these provisions become standard in the arbitral industry, then arbitral insti-
tutions would no longer have an economic incentive for a race to the ethical
bottom in search of clients. In addition, if these terms become standard, e-
businesses would have an independent incentive to adopt them.
The ultimate sanction that a government may apply is the repudiation
of the arbitration as a legitimate process to resolve consumer disputes. In
the special case of consumer arbitration, governments could impose im-
pediments and procedural requirements that are absent in commercial B2C
arbitration. Governments could elect to shift the burden of proof from the
consumer to the e-merchant. The party seeking to enforce the award could
be required to make some showing that the process leading to the award
comports with due process and fair play. If the arbitrator and ODR pro-
vider follows the OECD Guidelines, this will be a minimal burden. Al-
ready, many arbitral institutions have rles governing commercial
arbitration that either comply or substantially comply with the OECD re-
quirements.
Alternatively, courts could apply shifting standards of review depend-
ing on the level of process that was applied during the arbitration. Under
the New York Convention, the total denial of due process renders the arbi-
tration award potentially unenforceable.1 74 This is the existing floor for due
173 Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Resolving E-Commerce Disputes, B2B, and B2C: An In-
troduction to Some Online Dispute Resolution Modalities, ADR & THE LAW 348 (18th ed.
2002).
174 Whether the parties may contract for judicial review under the New York Convention
is unclear. For example, there is a split in the circuits interpreting the Federal Arbitration
Act and whether it permits the parties to contract for judicial review in excess of that pro-
vided for in the FAA. Compare Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888
(9th Cir. 1997); and Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th
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process. I propose that the floor be raised in steps.
Consumer expectations are defined by their culture and real world ex-
periences, and consumers expect and demand a higher level of process than
is currently provided by ODR. ODR should meet these expectations.
Therefore, when a party seeks to enforce the award, government should en-
deavor to ensure that consumer expectations as to process and protection
are met. Consumers will expect to receive at least the same level of protec-
tion in ODR as they would receive in a dispute resolved using traditional
non-cyber means of dispute resolution. This would not require the parties
to relitigate the underlying dispute before the court, but rather the court
would examine the process leading to the award and determine whether the
award comports with the laws and public policy of the enforcing jurisdic-
tion. Depending where the arbitration falls on the due process continuum
from arbitrary and capricious to due process and fair play, the court may re-
form the award, remand with instructions for further proceedings, or vacate
the award and order the dispute to trial in a state sponsored court.
D. Judicial Review or Judicial Deference of Arbitral Awards
If the OECD Guidelines state aspirational policies that may be hard to
identify and quantify in practice, the European Union's Principles are suf-
ficiently definite that one can use them to measure the due process of an
ODR provider. Arbitral awards that fall within the "safe harbor" provisions
of the Principles established by the European Union should be presump-
tively enforceable in a court, and those B2C arbitral awards that do not
comply with the OECD Guidelines should be presumptively unenforceable
in court absent an affirmative finding by the court that the parties received
"due process"; and, those awards rendered with some process between these
two benchmarks will receive varying degrees of judicial scrutiny. Finally,
courts should not enforce those consumer arbitration awards that do not
comport with section V of the New York Convention under any circum-
stances. 175
Cir. 1995) with Chi. Typographical Union v. Chi. Sun- Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505
(7th Cir. 1991); compare Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir.
Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished opinion) with Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,
934 (10th Cir. 2001); UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997
(8th Cir. 1998); Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 95 Cal. App. 4th 730 (2002); see
Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error-An Option to Consider, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 103, 108-10 (1997).
175 Section IV is permissive. It provides that a court may elect not to enforce an award
that does not comport with the New York Convention, but a court may elect to enforce the
award. In B2C international commercial arbitration, the New York Convention should be
the floor.
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1. Selecting the Standard of Review
"A standard of review is 'a limiting mechanism which defines an ap-
pellate court's scope of review."",176 A differential standard of review would
require a careful balance between encouraging parties to raise significant
bona fide issues on appeal and discouraging them from unnecessarily or
frivolously relitigating the merits of the underlying dispute. As the process
and procedures used by the arbitrator and the ODR provider move along the
continuum from arbitrary to "due process" and "fair play," the court would
give correspondingly greater deference to the arbitral award. Since awards
that fall within these voluntary safe harbor provisions would be less expen-
sive to reduce to a court judgment, the arbitrator, arbitral institution, and the
parties have an incentive to assure a more level playing field.
The rationale behind all appellate review may be fairly characterized in
two extremes: an appellate court will defer in large part to a trial court's de-
termination where the lower court is in a better position to make that deter-
mination than is the appellate court; conversely, little or no deference is
accorded where the appellate court is as capable of determining the question
as is the trial court. 177 The standard of review should promote both judicial
and arbitral efficiency while protecting consumer interests in a fair proc-
ess. 178 Courts should examine the process and procedures used to produce
the award.
The reviewing court will often be in the same position as the arbitrator
in making factual determinations; therefore, the standard of review should
be sufficient to ensure arbitral compliance with due process and fair play
considerations and achieve error correction without unduly encouraging
unnecessary or frivolous appeals. 179 This requires a normative determina-
tion of which sorts of errors society is prepared to tolerate. If errors of law
176 Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review--Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L.
REV. 231, 232 (1991) (quoting Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF.
L. J. 377, 379 (1984)).177 Id. at 239 (quoting State v. Pepin, 328 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)).
178 B2C disputes potentially implicate two sets of interests. These interests are independ-
ent from the perspective of the disputants but are independent from the perspective of the
sovereign. Frequently, there is a private dispute. For example, a breach of contract may
raise issues of consumer protection laws. The parties wish to resolve the dispute, and the
state has an interest in having effective and adequate enforcement of consumer protection
legislation by having the consumer litigate these issues as a private attorney general. Even if
the proper resolution of a private law dispute does not normally implicate state interests (a
contention that I disagree with), the state's interest in having its public law enforced is a suf-
ficient interest and public policy concern to justify intervention in what is usually a purely
private dispute resolution mechanism.
179 See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Appealing Judgments, JOE C.
DAVIS WORKING PAPER No. 99-3, at 44 (Mar. 1999), available at http://papers.ssm.com!
sol3/delivery.cfn/98090711.pdf~abstractid=124368 (analyzing the effect of evidentiary
standards on a party's propensity to bring an appeal).
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are the greater threat to the development of consumer confidence, then there
should be a heightened standard of review for the arbitrator's application of
law to the facts. Correspondingly, if errors of fact are more significant to
the development of consumer confidence in e-commerce, then those ques-
tions may receive heightened scrutiny.
Alternatively, the claims of error will receive the same level of review
and permit the costs of the judicial review to deter frivolous review. Fi-
nally, there is the option of permitting a "free appeal" to a trial court, but
appeals from that judgment would be only by permission of the court.
There is a third type of error: those made by the reviewing court. This arti-
cle begs the question of whether subsequent appeals are appropriate once
the award enters the public courts, but it does suggest that because the pub-
lic law-making function is significant, subsequent appellate review of trial
court judgments on arbitral awards is justified, and the normal "costs" of
judicial proceedings should deter frivolous appeals of orders confirming or
vacating arbitral awards.
2. Cold Appellate Record in ODR
The function of the "record" in ODR, as opposed to ADR or trial
courts, is different; this difference may affect the role of the reviewing
court. Frequently, appellate courts are loath to review the fact finding of a
lower court because the appellate record is arguably incomplete. The ap-
pellate record lacks the "nuances, and attitudes that influence a trial judge..
,180 As the United States Supreme Court has remarked:
'[i]t is because demeanor-attitude and manner-is a significant factor in
weighing testimonial evidence that it is axiomatic the trier of fact, before
whom the witness testified and was cross-examined ... ,is the sole judge of the
credibility of a witness and of the weight to be given his testimony.' No such
determination of credibility is possible when the witness comes before the trial
factfinder by the reading of a cold transcript.181
This is because both personal experience and empirical research
180 United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 342-43 (1988); Cannon v. Cannon, 80 F. Supp.
79, 80 (D.C. 1936) ("Experience has demonstrated that one of the surest ways to determine
the credibility of any witness is to observe the manner and demeanor of that witness on the
stand."); EDWARD J. DEVIrrT ET AL., FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 73.01 (1987); Rebecca
White Berch, A Proposal to Amend Rule 30(b) of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Cross-Disciplinary and Empirical Evidence Supporting Presumptive Use of Video to Record
Depositions, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 349 (1990) ("definition of speech includes not only
the speaker's lexical and syntactic choices-items that can be stenographically transcribed-
but also the paralinguistic features-items that cannot be captured by stenographic transcrip-
tion.").
181 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 198 (1970) (citation omitted).
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teaches that "[w]hen [a] listener perceives a conflict between the speaker's
statement and the accompanying meta-communication cues, the listener
usually disbelieves the statement, since 'we trust actions more than ...
words.' ' 182 This deference to meta-communications that do not appear in
the record results in a rule that, generally, "[t]he reviewing court may con-
sider only those few matters bearing on credibility that can be fully deter-
mined from a cold appellate record."
' 183
ODR takes place using computer-mediated communications, which are
easy and inexpensive to preserve for further proceedings. Outside of cyber-
space, there are significant costs to record ephemeral oral testimony and a
significant portion of the communicative context may not appear in the
transcript. 184 In contrast to ADR or traditional trial practice, the arbitrator
or the parties may save the entire record and transmit it for subsequent pro-
ceedings. 85 In ODR, the appellate record is identical to the evidence ad-
duced before the arbitral tribunal. 186 The initial fact finder has no greater
access to meta-communication cues than does any other viewer or reader of
the record. Accordingly, there must be another basis to restrain appellate
courts from interfering with the fact-finding of the arbitrator independent of
whether the fact finder is in the best position to evaluate the evidence.
Since the fact finder and appellate reviewer are equally competent to make
findings of fact, limited appellate review must be justified on the principle
of judicial efficiency. De novo consideration of the record is likely to result
in unnecessary appeals. The reviewing court must establish standards of
review that protect the error detecting, correcting, and law making function
of the reviewing court. The level of review must be consistent with appro-
priate appellate function, from correcting errors of law or fact to developing
or clarifying the law.
3. Review ofArbitration Awards in Private Law Disputes
When an arbitrator is adjudicating a purely private law issue, the sug-
gested relationship between a reviewing court and the arbitral tribunal is
182 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment: Law And Tactics, 9 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 183, 186 (1985) (citation omitted).
183 Drost v. Texas, 47 S.W.3d 41, 45 (Tex. App. 2001).
184 Robert C. Bordone, Note, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach
- Potential, Problems, anda Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175, 181 n.26 (1998).
185 The bandwidth of the proceedings may vary from text that is readily recordable and
requires very little storage space to video conferencing which will consume substantial
bandwidth and require significant storage space. But in either case, storage is readily avail-
able and relatively inexpensive. For example, a record of a video proceeding may be com-
pressed and stored as .mpeg files on CD-ROMs.
186 It is not clear what this loss of meta-conmnunication will mean to the fact-finding
process. Gibbons, supra note 38, at 539. However, this loss is equally present in all levels of
the proceedings.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 23:1 (2002)
analogous to one before an administrative agency and subsequent judicial
proceedings. 187 The parties to the dispute entrusted its resolution to the ar-
bitrator because the arbitrator has a special ability to interpret the written
contract in light of the norms of the industry and e-commerce technology. 188
These factors are usually outside the experience and competency of a state
court, even assuming under the rules of evidence that such evidence is ad-
missible.
Common law countries,189 civil code countries, ' 90and international ad-
judicatory bodies' 9' have well-established standards of judicial review for
administrative proceedings. For example, courts in the United Kingdom
frequently apply a two-element test as a standard of review for administra-
tive actions:
The 'Wednesbury' principle that a discretionary decision of a public
body/officer should only be set aside if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable
authority could ever come to it,192 [and] ... the proportionality principle re-
187 Generally, few disputes will be purely private law disputes. Most, if not all, disputes
will require the application of public law principles to the private dispute. This may result in
my proposed dichotomy becoming, in practice, a distinction without a difference from public
law disputes.
188 Bordone, supra note 184, at 204.
189 See Richard Clayton, Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights Act and
The Proportionality Principle, 5 EuR. HUM. RTs L. REV. 504 (2001) (standards of review for
human rights issues discussing several common law countries).
190 Deborah D'Angelo, The "Check" on International Peace and Security Maintenance:
The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review of Security Council Resolutions, 23
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 561, 565-66 (2000) (citing Germany, France, Japan, and the
European Community's ("EC") High Court of Justice).
1W See Marco Bronckers & Natalie McNelis, Fact and Law in Pleadings Before the WTO
Appellate Body, INT. T.L.R. 1999, 118-23 (discussing different standards of review used in
WTO appellate proceedings). Frequently, a single treaty regime may have multiple stan-
dards of review respecting the juridical and cultural autonomy of the adherents, for example:
[Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NFATA),] [e]ach country has a standard of re-
view that is spelled out in Chapter 19, and they differ significantly from each other. The standard in
the United States is based on substantial evidence on the record, and the agency's decision must be
made in accordance with the law. In Mexico, the standard of review is set out in Article 238 of the
"C6digo Fiscal de la Federaci6n" [Federal Fiscal Code], based solely on administrative record. In
Canada, the standard of review involves the application of principles of natural justice and fair play,
a much more equitable view of things. Although it looks like due process, it is not exactly applica-
tion of due process as [lawyers] think of it in the United States. Thus, the standard of review is dis-
tinct for each country.
James Holbein, The Administration of Chapter 19 Binational Proceedings Under NAFTA, 5
U.S.-MEx. L.J. 57, 61 (1997) (citations omitted).192 Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223
(1947) (C.A.). Judicial review of administrative action in British law is governed in part by
the Wednesbury standard. Wednesbury review scrutinizes administrative action to deter-
mine whether a minister has followed the statutory objective and whether the minister has
refrained from taking into account irrelevant considerations. Once those questions are an-
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quire[s] the courts to weigh and balance the aims of an act, measure or decision
against the impact upon the applicant. 
193
Canadian courts will review administrative acts to determine if there
was "(1) a violation of natural justice; (2) an act in excess of jurisdiction;
(3) a refusal to exercise jurisdiction; (4) an error of law; or (5) 'an erroneous
finding of fact ... made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard
to the material before it.""
94
Because I am more familiar with the conventions, connotations, deno-
tations, and proper lexicographic uses of these terms of art in the United
States, I will discuss this topic using terms that are more familiar to U.S.
lawyers. For example, if the arbitrator is interpreting private law provi-
sions 195 in a contract dispute between the parties, then the standard of re-
view should be whether the arbitral award was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ... [or] unsup-
ported by substantial evidence."'196 Presently, courts have some power un-
der the New York Convention to examine an award to determine whether it
is arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, or contrary to law. I am proposing that
in the special context of consumer arbitration that the consumer be afforded
the additional protection to insure that there is "substantial evidence" to
support the arbitral award. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
'' 97
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance,
and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion."'' 98 "Although this inquiry into the facts is to
be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one,"
the Court's review function is exhausted where a rational basis is found. 199
This standard may be sufficient to deter arbitral overreaching and provide
an incentive to assure fair awards without encouraging unnecessary relitiga-
tion of issues already adjudicated in the arbitration.
swered in favor of the minister, a decision may only be reversed if a court finds that the min-
ister has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have
come to it. Rafael Raffaelli III, Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Brind: Unconventional Intrusions on Freedom of Expression, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
221, 237 (1991) (analogous in the United States to the rational basis test).
193 Erika Szyszczak, Judicial Review of Public Acts, 23 EUR. L. REV. 89, 90 n.5 (1998).
194 James F. Smith, Comparing Federal Judicial Review of Administrative Court Deci-
sions in the United States and Canada, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 503, 558-59 (2000) (citation omit-
ted).
195 This assumes there is no independent public policy interest reflected in that contract or
dispute that would warrant a higher or more searching standard of review.
196 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
197 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
198 Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990).
199 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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4. Review ofArbitration Awards in Public Law Disputes
Unlike a court reviewing the resolution of the dispute of private parties
and the private law governing their relationship, a reviewing court should
treat arbitral decisions applying public law in a manner analogous to that of
an appellate court reviewing a trial court.200 The arbitrator has no special
competency in interpreting or applying public law. Nevertheless, the arbi-
trator may still have had a unique opportunity to observe the witness and
make credibility determinations or the arbitrator may bring technical
knowledge or skills to the dispute that may not be possessed by a generalist
judge. The state has an interest independent of the parties in having public
laws fairly and uniformly applied to disputes. E-commerce disputes are
likely to require the charting of new legal territory rather than the treading
of well-worn legal paths of known legal principles.2 1 Policy dictates that
courts guard their judicial interpretation function in the context of B2C dis-
pute resolution.
The standard of review is a normative decision, optimally one that
promotes error correction and the creation of law without promoting frivo-
lous appeals. "[B]ecause ... parties are not frivolous in how they use appel-
late resources, they will proceed only when they have a reasonable
likelihood of securing access to higher level courts and when a decision on
the merits will not lead to a policy or outcome unfavorable to their inter-
ests. 20 2 The standard of review will therefore either encourage or discour-
age a losing party from bringing an appeal by making success on appeal
more or less likely. Success may be measured in absolute terms; the court
enforcing or declining to enforce the arbitral award. Success may also be
measured in terms of the court's ability to create law; the court's ability to
reach a legal issue on which the party wishes to create public law. Stan-
dards of review make either measure of success more or less probable in a
given case.
If the question is one of public policy or the interpretation of a public
law, the reviewing court should engage in an independent review of the
public policy or questions of law. "[I]ndependent review represents an in-
termediate level of scrutiny, more rigorous than the abuse-of-discretion or
clear-error standards, but stopping short of plenary or de novo review.,' 20 3
200 Since most disputes will raise questions of the application of public law to the private
dispute, this will most likely be the default mode governing most disputes.
01 Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A
Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1263 (2001) ("The American justice system sub-
stantially relies upon private enforcement to help define and explain regulatory legislation
and to insure that it is enforced.").
202 See Burton M. Atkins, Alternative Models of Appeal Mobilization in Judicial Hierar-
chies, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 780, 782 (1993).
203 United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1990).
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The appeals court must determine that "[i]f upon careful review of all the
facts and the trial judge's reasons the appeals court concludes that a differ-
ent result should have been reached, the ... decision may be amended or
reversed. 20 4 In the ultimate analysis, "appellate courts are ill-equipped to
resolve factbound disputes, this standard cedes particular respect, as a prac-
tical matter, to the lower court's factual determinations."205 Independent re-
view, when properly applied, should result in affirming the arbitrator's
credibility determinations when live testimony is critical. In cases where
the record is documentary, the appeals court could, when appropriate, en-
gage in a more searching review of the record. In either case, the reviewing
court may examine the record to assure that the arbitrator applied the proper
legal principles to the public law issues in the dispute and that the award
accords with the public policy of the enforcing jurisdiction.
5. Judicial Review in Practice
A significant question is how courts will apply this model of commer-
cial consumer arbitration in practice. The range of disputes go from fully
negotiated agreements to be arbitrated by sophisticated parties to the more
common, ubiquitous, mass market contract that remains unread or uncom-
prehended by the consumer.20 6 This article recommends that one element to
determine the appropriate level of review is the process by which the parties
procured the arbitration clause. In essence, as the contracting process
moves from the classic model of a freely negotiated agreement embodying
the meeting of the minds to a contract of adhesion, courts should give cor-
respondingly less deference to the agreement to arbitrate and the process
provided for in the agreement unless it embodies processes and procedures
that protect consumer expectations of clue process.
Freely negotiated arbitration agreement clauses by sophisticated com-
prehending parties should receive substantial judicial deference as such an
agreement embodies the free will of the parties and presumably represents
an agreement that maximizes individual utility and the proper market allo-
cation of risk. The current status quo probably provides adequate protec-
tion for these parties.
However, freely negotiated arbitration agreements will be the excep-
tion rather than the rule in most e-commerce transactions. Therefore, one
204 United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 814 (1st Cir. 1990).
25 Tortora, 922 F.2d at 882-83.
206 As a practical matter, the costs of bringing a court proceeding after the arbitration will
be significant. These costs should moot appeals of arbitral awards unless the underlying is-
sue is significant. These appeals will quite often be brought to establish settled legal princi-
ples to guide future arbitral awards, because a party has some other incentive to bring
financially irrational litigation, or, in a rare case, the value of the dispute itself may justify
these subsequent judicial proceedings.
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must analyze as a practical matter how this will play out in the market
place. Resolved disputes may be largely divided into four categories: con-
sumer-wins, consumer-loses, merchant-wins, merchant-loses.2 °7 This arti-
cle starts with the default rule that the merchant will select the arbitration
processes and that the merchant has the incentive to select processes that
favor her position. The easiest cases should be consumer-wins or merchant
loses. The court should interpret the agreement to arbitrate against the party
drafting the arbitration clause and provide deference to an arbitral award
against the drafter. However, this is insufficient. The court must also com-
pare the award against the remedy sought in order to assure that the con-
sumer received a complete and adequate remedy or a merchant "loss" is not
in reality an award against the consumer. For example, a merchant loss
could result in an award where the merchant receives less than she re-
quested but more than she is legally entitled to. The more complicated
situation is where the consumer-loses or merchant-wins. In this case, the
court should examine the process that led to the award, and as the award
moves into the safe harbor provisions that assure a minimal level of con-
sumer due process, the enforcing court should apply an increasing level of
deference to the arbitration award. This may include shifting the burden for
enforcement from the party challenging the award to the prevailing party.
VII. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
If governments encourage due process and fair play standards as part
of the arbitration process and instruct courts to apply a heightened standard
of review, will such policies be permissible under existing international
commercial arbitration law? 20 8 Of the major conventions on the
international enforcement of arbitral awards,20 9 the most important is the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
207 For the purposes of this section, "the party" is the one who commences the action. In
consumer-wins situations, consumer commences the action and is successful at arbitration.
208 Because each country is free to unilaterally change its municipal law governing con-
sumer arbitration, I will not address the question of enforcing domestic arbitration awards.
209
The conventions applicable to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards include the New
York Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923, the Geneva Convention on
the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, the World Bank's 1965 Convention on the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, the European Conven-
tion on Commercial Arbitration of 1961, and the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration of Panama.
Kenneth T. Ungar, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under UNCITRAL 's Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 717, 722 (1987) (inter-
nal citations omitted). Some Conventions may provide for broader enforcement. For exam-
ple, the 1975 Inter-American Convention does not contain a provision limiting its scope to
relationships that are considered commercial under the national law of a member state. Ken-
nedy, supra note 40, at § 6.
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Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards (the New York Convention).210 The New York Convention is
the primary legal basis for enforcing international commercial arbitration
awards.21' If a consumer dispute is commercial in nature and is between
parties in different countries or parties in the same country seeking to en-
force the award in a third-country, then the arbitration may result in a "for-
eign" arbitration award for the purposes of the New York Convention.
For example, under the New York Convention, an award rendered in
Ohio, United States, and enforced in Paris, France, is subject to the New
York Convention. Should the parties seek to enforce the award in Massa-
chusetts or California, then the New York Convention no longer applies,
and the party seeking to enforce the award must rely on the municipal law
of the United States or the individual state. 212 The New York Convention
does not require that the parties come from different countries or even that
at least one of the parties be a citizen of a state that is a signatory to the
New York Convention. 213 It merely requires that the award be issued in a
member country or if issued in a non-member country, enforced in a mem-
ber country that does not require reciprocity.
210 Ungar, supra note 209, at 722; New York Convention, supra note 44; Leonard V.
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1060-61 (1961). But
as noted in subsequent discussion of the New York Convention, there are provisions that
may require reinterpretation, clarification, or renegotiation if the New York Convention is to
provide a predictable basis on which to resolve e-disputes in the B2C context. For example,
it is unclear the effect of arbitrating in one jurisdiction but specifying that the law of another
jurisdiction will apply to the arbitration. Alan Scott Rau, New York Convention in the Ameri-
can Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 213, 224-25 (1996).
211 RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 101 (2000). The grounds on which to set aside an award under UNCITRAL
are virtually identical to those under the New York Convention. Peter Binder, Application
for Setting Aside as Exclusive Recourse Against Arbitral Award, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 205, 208-10 (2000);
MURRAY SMITH, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 522
(1991). Accordingly, these recommendations may be useful in improving the law in juris-
dictions that have adopted UNCITRAL.
212 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. I.
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the terri-
tory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought,
and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbi-
tral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement
are sought.
Id. There is one caveat. For example, if the award involves a foreign party or if there was a
substantial nexus to another jurisdiction, then some courts may apply the New York Conven-
tion to the award. See Edward Chukwuemeke Okeke, Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. Bane, Boon or Boondoggle?, 10 N. Y. INT'L L. REV. 29, 36-37 (1997).
213 Id. at 36.
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In international commercial arbitration, there is the strong presumption
that arbitrations are valid and the award should be enforced.21 4 The New
York Convention's "pro-enforcement bias '2 15 prevents any court from re-
viewing the merits of the underlying dispute when the prevailing party
seeks to convert the arbitral award into a court judgment.1 6 Therefore, one
must exclude the dispute or the resulting arbitral award from one governed
under the New York Convention in order for a shifting standard of review
proposal to work.
This section will discuss the key provisions of the New York Conven-
tion. First, the two predicate provisions that bring the "agreement to arbi-
trate" and the underlying dispute within the subject matter of the New York
Convention, then the enforcement provisions and the limited grounds on
which a court may decline to enforce an award and will conclude by analyz-
ing whether member states to the New York Convention could adopt a slid-
ing standard of review of arbitral awards in the B2C context.
217
A. Subject Matter of the New York Convention
The New York Convention governs agreements to arbitrate that relate
to a "subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration and [that are] in
writing., 218 All "defined legal relationship[s], whether contractual or not"
are susceptible to resolution by arbitration, so most e-commerce disputes
will fall within the rubric of the legal relationship limitation on arbitral sub-
ject matter.2  Assuming that the dispute arises out of a defined legal rela-
tionship, if there is a valid written agreement to arbitrate, courts in adhering
states must order the parties to arbitrate, if so requested.22 °
2149 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (This section of the code makes enforcement of the Convention
law); Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and Interna-
tionalArbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1653 (1998).
215 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de l'lndustrie du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974).
216 GARNETT, supra note 211, at 103.
217 Some Conventions may provide for broader enforcement. For example, the 1975 In-
ter-American Convention does not contain a provision limiting its scope to relationships con-
sidered commercial under the national law of a member state. Kennedy, supra note 40, at §
6. Accordingly, the analysis must be undertaken for each treaty regime that a country may
adhere to. Such analysis is outside the narrow scope of this article.
218 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. 11 (1).
219 1d; Pedro Menocal, We'll Do It For You Any Time: Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards and Contracts in the United States, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 317,
321 (1999); but see, New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. 1(3) (allowing states to
limit enforcement "to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or
not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such
declaration.").
220 Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing New York Con-
vention, supra note 44, at art. 11 (3))
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Courts have not yet decided whether an electronic contract to arbitrate
will be enforced under the New York Convention. Article 11(2) of the New
York Convention provides that "[t]he term 'agreement in writing' shall in-
clude an arbitral clause ... contained in an exchange of letters or tele-
grams.",221 In the jurisdictions that have adopted electronic signature laws,
electronic agreements to arbitration may be treated as writings under the
New York Convention. The New York Convention supports both agree-
ments to arbitrate and the arbitral award.222 And once the arbitral award is-
sues, courts must enforce the award subject to the narrow limited
exceptions provided for in the New York Convention.2 3
The writing requirement is problematic in the context of e-commerce,
where the contract may be embodied in an exchange of email, in a click on
a box labeled "agree," or by proceeding beyond a warning. The law of the
enforcing country defines "writing" for the purposes of the New York Con-
vention in Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration as "other means of telecommunication which provide a
[written] record of the agreement., 224 The United Kingdom Arbitration Act
defines writing as "being recorded by any means." 225 The European Un-
ion's Directive on Electronic Signatures provides that electronic signatures
"satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in electronic
form in the same manner as a hand-written signature satisfies those re-
quirements in relation to paper-based data; and are admissible as evidence
in legal proceedings. 226 Under the United States Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act ("E-Sign"), online and electronic con-
tracts signed with an electronic signature will have the same legal force as a
signed paper contract.227 Recent proposed amendments to the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") 228 and a proposed uniform law, the Uniform
221 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. 11(2).
222 Id. at art. V; see Scherk v. Albert-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974).
223 Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 190 F. Supp. 2d 936, 945 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (quoting In re Arbitration Between Trans
Chem. Ltd. and China Nat'l Mach. Import and Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 309 (S.D.
Tex. 1997) (citing New York Convention, supra note 43, at Art. V)).
224 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 66, at art. 7(2).
225 Arbitration Act of 1996, 1996 c. 23, § 5(6) (Eng.).
226 The Council Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 December 1999 on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, 2000 O.J. (L 13)
12, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en/media/sign/Dir99-93-
ecEN.pdf.
227 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-
7006, 7021, 7031. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defines writing as "any... inten-
tional reduction to tangible form." U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (1994).
228 See, e.g., American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Proposed Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales § 2-
103(o), available at http://www.law.upenn.eduibll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.pdf ("'Record' means
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Computer Information Transaction Act ("UCITA"), delete the spatially lim-
ited concept of "writing" in favor of the more inclusive term "record." A
record is "information inscribed on a tangible medium or stored in an elec-
tronic or other medium and retrievable in perceivable form. '229 All of these
statutes would permit a court to enforce an arbitration agreement entered
into and memorialized by electronic communication.
Courts in jurisdictions that have not adopted definitions of electronic
communication as constituting writings and signatures may have to look to
the text of the New York Convention. There may contain an independent
basis to enforce electronic contracts. The New York Convention validates
the technology of the late 1950s, telegrams, as an electrical method of
communicating a writing. Telexes and telegrams are the immediate prede-
cessors to e-mail. Therefore, e-mail should be recognized as a "writing."
The drafters of the New York Convention could hardly have desired to
freeze commercial practices into the straightjacket of immediate post-war
technology, especially in light of the great flexibility contained within the
New York Convention to grow with evolving commercial practice. So, as
long as there is a sufficient "writing" to meet the evidentiary intent behind
the writing requirement, 230 then there is more than a colorable basis to hold
that an exchange of e-mail or an affirmative mouse-click to be sufficient to
constitute a "writing" for the purposes of creating an enforceable arbitration
agreement.
B. Reservations
Over half the signatories to the New York Convention have exercised
their right to limit the applicability of the Convention. 231 An adherent to the
New York Convention may limit its applicability by electing two possible
exceptions: reciprocity or commercial subject matter.232 The first possible
reservation is reciprocity and the other is limiting the New York Conven-
tion to "commercial" relationships. 233
information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form"); Revision of Uniform Commercial Code, at
Art. 1, § 1-201(33a), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blI/ulc/uccl/Uccl61401.htm
('""Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an
electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form").
229 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 102(55) (amended 2001), avail-
able at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita0l.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
230 Cf. JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 200-01 (1999).
231 Id. at 207-10.
232 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. 1 (3).
233 Considering the number of signatories to the New York Convention, this may be an
insignificant problem. See Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Arti-
cles V and VII of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 43, 46 & n.16 (2002) ("One hundred twenty-six countries, includ-
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1. Reciprocity Reservation
The first reservation is reciprocity. The New York Conventions per-
mits countries to only recognize awards issued in other member states.
234
This is one reason that the situs and the curial law governing the arbitration
may be legally significant and especially problematic in ODR.235
C. "Commercial" Relationship Reservation
The second reservation permits a country to limit its enforcement "to
differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not,
which are considered as commercial under the national law of the
State... ,,.236 Member states may also limit their application of the New
York Convention to disputes arising out of legal relationships that are con-
sidered "commercial" under the domestic law of the enforcing country. 7
Despite the legal significance of the term "commercial," the New York
Convention does not define it. 238 This compels commentators and the
courts to analyze existing practices as a guide to interpret the term.
A 1977 Bombay, India High Court case set a precedent for countries to
exclude some classification of disputes from enforcement by holding that
ing the United States, have ratified this treaty.").
234 See Gerald Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius:
United States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral A wards, 3 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1971).235 Elisabeth M. Senger-Weiss, Enforcing Foreign Arbitration Awards, 53 WTR Disp.
RESOL. J. 70, 73-74 (1998).236 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. 1 (3) (emphasis added); Senger-Weiss,
supra note 235, at 73-74.
237 Id.; Statement of Richard D. Kearney, Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, S. Rep. No. 91-702 app. at 6 (1970) ("our purpose in adhering to the Convention is for
the beneficial effects it will produce for the foreign commerce of the United States and not to
make any changes with respect to matters that are traditionally within the jurisdiction of the
50 States of the Union.").
238 See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("Research has developed nothing to show what the purpose of the "commercial"
limitation was. We may logically speculate that it was to exclude matrimonial and other
domestic relations awards, political awards, and the like."); GIORGIO GAJA, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IIl.A. 1-III.C.226 (reprinting the Preparatory Works for the New
York Convention). Compare this lack of a definition with the proposed Hague Conference
On Private International Law, art. I, at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last
visited February 3, 2003). Article I specifically excludes:
revenue, customs or administrative matters ... a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons; b)
maintenance obligations; c) matrimonial property regimes and other rights and obligations arising
out of marriage or similar relationships; d) wills and succession; e) insolvency, composition or
analogous proceedings; J) social security; g) arbitration and proceedings related thereto; [and] h)
admiralty or maritime matters.
Id.
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not only must the underlying transaction be commercial, but also, the do-
mestic law of the enforcing country must prescribe the transaction as a
commercial transaction.2 39 In the United States, this would require a change
in the law to redefine commercial to exclude consumer contracts. Under
U.S. law, "commercial" means "a contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce" and applies to all contracts that Congress could regulate un-
der the full sweep of its Commerce Clause powers.24° Other countries have
excluded certain classifications of disputes from the term "commercial" by
statute.24'
The commercial relationship clause reservation is one possible avenue
for a nation to exclude foreign arbitral awards against their citizens from
enforcement under the New York Convention. In order to apply the sliding
standard of review that this article proposes, countries that have limited the
applicability of the New York Convention to "commercial" relationships,
may attempt to exclude consumer contracts by redefining "commercial"
under domestic law to exclude consumer contracts.242 Theoretically, there
are several possible methods of avoiding enforcement under the "commer-
cial" relationship reservation of the New York Convention. Perhaps the
simplest is to exclude transactions under a specified value. This would pro-
tect the smaller and possibly less sophisticated merchants and consumers.
Consumer transactions could be defined as a transaction that "at the time of
contracting [is] intended to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. 243 It is also possible that a consumer transaction, in
contrast with a commercial one, could be defined as "any contract between
239 The Chemtex Fibres court held that
In my opinion, in order to invoke the provisions of Section 3 [requiring a High Court to stay a legal
proceeding brought in a matter where an arbitration clause properly applied], it is not enough to es-
tablish that an agreement is commercial. It must also be that it is commercial by virtue of a provi-
sion of law or an operative legal principle in force in India.
India Organic Chemicals, Ltd., v. Chemtex Fibres, Inc., 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 271, 272-73
(1979) (Bombay, India) (technology transfer agreement was not considered a commercial
relationship under Indian law, and, therefore, the Court held that the award was outside the
scope of the Convention) (emphasis added); but see Eur. Grain & Shipping, Ltd. v. Bombay
Extractions, Ltd., 8 Y.B. COM. ARB. 371, 375 (1983) (Bombay, India) (expressly rejecting
the "law in force in India" language).
240 See Prograph Intern. Inc. v. Barhydt, 928 F. Supp. 983, 988 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995)).
241 Ungar, supra note 209, at 726 & n.49; see ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW
YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
54 (1981) (citing Article 51 of Decision No. 24 (Andean Foreign Investment Code, adopted
on December 30, 1971), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 138, 153 (1977)).
242 Ungar, supra note 209, at 725-26.
243 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) § 102(15), at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.htm.
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a consumer and a business for goods or services that the purpose of which
is outside a consumer's normal trade or profession .... "244
Courts could also take a bright line approach to the transactions, focus-
ing on the time the parties enter into the agreement and deferring to the par-
ties' intent at the time of contracting. Alternatively, courts could take a
hybrid approach starting with a rebuttable presumption that the transactions
are consumer contracts, but the e-merchant may prove that this is a com-
mercial transaction within the meaning of the proposed act and therefore the
New York Convention would apply. The first type of provision would pro-
vide a bright line rule. E-merchants would know that if the transaction had
a value of less than x, then arbitration would be subject to the type of slid-
ing review discussed in this article. The second type of provision is more
problematic; the merchant would have to know the subjective intent of the
purchaser at the time the transaction is completed. Nevertheless, this type
of provision would protect high value transactions that are truly consumer
transactions and allow for low value transactions that are truly commercial.
Of course, in the case of an individual who is both a consumer and a mer-
chant, the focus would be on the purpose for the transaction at the time of
purchase. These questions may be resolved in the drafting phase of the
proposed legislation and would be a matter of domestic public policy.
Such a law would not deny the prevailing party the right to enforce the
award. E-merchants would be free to seek enforcement in other jurisdic-
tions that do not have the same limitations. 245 But, presumably unsophisti-
244 The 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, art. 6(1).
Merchants may be defined as a person:
(A) that deals in information or [goods] of the kind involved in the transaction;
(B) that by the person's occupation holds itself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the rele-
vant aspect of the business ... involved in the transaction; or
(C) to which the knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices ... involved in the transaction may be
attributed by the person's employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary that by its occupa-
tion holds itself out as having the knowledge or skill.
UCITA, supra note 229, at § 102(46).
245 SMITH, supra note 211, at 453 ("The party seeking enforcement is free to try else-
where. He still has a valid award and he may be able to enforce it in another [country] in
which the losing party has assets."); cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated Arbitra-
tion Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451, 462 (2000) (Summariz-
ing the dominant approaches to awards annulled by a court in the arbitral situs. The French
approach is that if the award meets French standards then French courts will enforce the
award. The Chromally Approach is that if the award meets American standards and the par-
ties have agreed not to appeal then it may be enforced. The LSA approach is that an award
annulled in the arbitral situs should be enforced unless it was on grounds that are interna-
tionally recognized. Finally, the comity approach is that an award annulled in the arbitral
situs should be enforced unless the decision to vacate was "procedurally unfair or contrary to
fundamental notions of justice." All of these approaches result in awards that are vacated or
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cated consumers will not have significant assets within the reach of courts
other than in their country of residence, and the domestic court may then
review the award to assure that it comports with the level of due process
that a resident of that country would expect in a consumer transaction.
246
Unfortunately while the New York Convention is ambiguous as to the
meaning of "commercial," redefining the term "commercial" to exclude
B2C contracts would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Convention
unless a member state is willing to exclude consumer contracts from all
forms of arbitration. This seems to be reflected in the European perspective
on consumer arbitration.
[I]n some Member States (e.g., France), consumer disputes can be found non-
arbitrable, at least to the extent that the right of consumers to go to court is ex-
cluded. However, such restrictions apply mainly in the case of domestic arbi-
trations, and may not apply with regard to international arbitrations involving
consumers, such as those falling under the New York Convention.247
While there is this evidence of limiting the subject matter of domestic arbi-
tration, there does not appear to be any support or examples of any country
excluding consumer arbitration awards from enforcement under the New
York Convention.24 8
annulled in the arbitral situs being enforced against the consumer in other jurisdictions.)
246
Because the status of consumer contracts under the Hague Conference on Private International Law
produced a Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters is still an open question as of the writing of this article, this article does not specu-
late on whether an award that would be unenforceable in the consumer's home country then reduced
to a judgment in a third-country could be then enforced in the consumer's country of residence under
the Hague Convention.
247 Morrison & Foerster LLP (Brussels), Legal Obstacles to ADR in European Business-
to-Consumer Electronic Commerce (Apr. 2000), at http://consumerconfidence.gbde.org/
adrstudy.doc (citing Vincent Tilman, Arbitrage et nouvelles Technologies: Alternative Cy-
berdispute Resolution, 2 REVUE UBIQUITE, 47-64 (1999) (citing as support Art. 2061 of the
French Civil Code, Art. 631 of the Code de commerce, and case law of the Cour de Cass-
ation)); FOUCHARD GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 38,
347-48 & n. 144-45 (Kluwer Law International 1999) ("In consumer contracts, the French
courts have held.., that the international character of the purchase of consumer goods was
sufficient for an arbitration clause to be effective.").
248 Article 3 of the European Union's Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
is one such example. It permits member states to prohibit contract clauses as presumptively
unfair if such clauses exclude or hinder
the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring
the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly re-
stricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the
applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract.
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, at
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D. Grounds on which a Court may Refuse to Enforce an Arbitral Award
If consumer arbitration awards are not excludable from the New York
Convention because they are "commercial" relationships under domestic
law, then Article V provides the exclusive grounds on which to refuse to
enforce an arbitral award. 4 9 Under Article V of the New York Convention,
even if there are grounds on which the court may decline to enforce an
award, these grounds are permissive so that the court may still elect to en-
force the award.250 Under the New York Convention, a court may decline
to enforce an arbitral award if a party is subject to some incapacity;251 the
agreement is not valid under the laws of the state governing the arbitration
agreement; 252 a party was not given proper notice or was unable to present
their case;2 53 the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction;254 the tribunal was not
composed in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the laws of the
jurisdiction governing the arbitration; 255 the arbitral award is not binding or
has been set aside under the laws of the jurisdiction governing the award; 256
the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitral under the laws or public pol-
http://www.lex2k.org/sfc/eudirective.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003). But, "[i]t is unclear
what is meant by 'arbitration not covered by legal provisions' but presumably this means
that any ADR system which forecloses a consumer's ability to go to court must provide legal
safeguards similar to those applicable in the court system." One commentator asserted with-
out analysis or citation to other legal authority that "While it is far from certain, it appears
that, under the national law of some Member States, disputes with consumers would per se
not be considered 'commercial,' so that the arbitral awards rendered in consumer ADR may
not be enforceable under the New York Convention in such countries." Christopher Kuner,
Legal Obstacles to ADR in European Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce, 5 ELEC.
COMM. & L. REP. (BNA) 773, 778 (July 19, 2000), available at http://
www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/00000365.pdf.
249 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(I) ("enforcement of [an] award may
be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes
... proof that" one of the enumerated defenses is applicable); see, e.g., Industrial Risk Insur-
ers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1445-46 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (citing
M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GrmbH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 1996)).
250 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(1). Also, article VII is usually inter-
preted to require the court to award the prevailing party, the same rights as she would have
under domestic arbitration law so that even if there is a valid defense under the New York
Convention, but domestic law does not independently recognize such a defense, then the ar-
bitration award should be enforced; see, e.g., In the Matter of the Arbitration of Certain Con-
troversies Between Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp.
907, 914 (D.C. 1996); Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the NY Convention: Further Reflections
on Chromally, 12 MEALEY'S INT. ARB. REP. 20, 30 (Apr. 1997); G. Sampliner, Enforcement
of Nullified Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 J. OF INT'L ARB. 140, 150-51 (1997).251 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(1)(a).
252 Id.
253 Id. at art. V(1)(b).
254 Id. at art. V(1)(c).
.. d. at art. V(l)(d).
256 New York Convention, supra note 44, at art. V(1)(e).
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icy of the enforcing country;257 and finally, the award violated the public
policy of the enforcing jurisdiction.258 This section will examine each pro-
vision in Article V in order to determine which, if any of them, may provide
a basis on which a state may exclude B2C arbitral awards from enforcement
under the New York Convention.
1. Incapacity/Invalidity Under the New York Convention
The New York Convention provides that if the parties to the agreement
are "under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, un-
der the law of the country where the award was made," a court may decline
to enforce the arbitral award.259 Because the parties to the arbitration award
are free to select the law that will govern the arbitration, this provision may
provide illusory relief. While this provision has some promise, a sophisti-
cated merchant or arbitration provider will contract around consumer pro-
tection laws or court decisions predicated on this provision. The court must
apply the parties' choice of law provisions. If the parties fail to select a
body of law, then the law of the place of the arbitration applies. Neverthe-
less, states may still legislate that consumer arbitration agreements are only
valid under some specified set of contingencies, including judicial review
that properly weigh the respective interests of the e-merchants in an en-
forceable award and the consumer's due process.
2. Tribunal Exceeded its Jurisdiction
This provision will rarely provide grounds on which to protect the e-
consumer. "If the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or if it contains de-
cisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission," a court may decline
to enforce the award. 260 The agreement to arbitrate will most likely specify
that all disputes arising out of the parties' legal relationship are subject to
arbitration. There is some suggestion in the literature and case law that
mistakes of law may constitute an arbitrator exceeding his or her jurisdic-
tion. 26 But:
[i]n the main, a successful challenge to an arbitration award, ... depends upon
257 Id. at art. V(2)(a).
258 Id. at art. V(2)(b).
259 Id. at Art. V(I)(a). In the United States, it is very likely that the parties must initially
raise the question of incapacity before the arbitrator as part of the proceeding. Prima Paint
Cor6. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1967).
26 New York Convention, supra note 44, at Art. V(1)(c).
261 Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review ofArbi-
tration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49,60-138 (1997).
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the challenger's ability to show that the award is "(1) unfounded in reason and
fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of
judges, ever could conceivably have made such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly
based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact.,
262
Therefore, it is unlikely that its provision would provide for adequate judi-
cial review of awards.
3. Lack of Proper Notice
If "[t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case[,]" a court may elect not to en-
force the arbitration agreement. 263 Courts will not second-guess an arbitra-
tor unless the process falls to a level where there is no process. Therefore,
it is unlikely that this provision will provide much protection for consum-
ers.
4. Tribunal not Composed According to Arbitration Agreement
"The composition of the arbitral authority of arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place." 2  This section has been used to challenge awards if the arbitrator is
biased or if the arbitrator was not selected according to the agreed upon
procedures. Under this provision, governments are not free to establish
procedures for the selection of arbitrators that ensure a fundamentally fair
process nor are they free to review the appointment other than that are in
compliance with the procedures elected by the parties. Because the parties
are free to agree on any method to choose the arbitrator, this is unlikely to
provide any protection to the consumer.
5. Non-arbitrability of Subject Matter of the Dispute
This is the most likely ground on which nation states could insulate
B2C disputes from judicial enforcement under the New York Convention.
The subject matter of the dispute must be out of a "defined legal relation-
ship, whether contractual or not, concerning subject matter capable of set-
tlement by arbitration. 265 Courts must enforce arbitration awards unless
262 Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Local 1445, United
Food and Commercial Workers v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir.1985)).
263 New York Convention, supra note 44, at Art. V()(b).
264 ld. at Art. V(1)(d).
265 Id. at Art. lL(2)(a).
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the award is void under local law266 or enforcement is otherwise excused
under the New York Convention. 267 Second, courts must give foreign arbi-
tration awards national treatment.2 68 Governments must provide at least the
same level of enforcement for an award under the New York Convention as
they would for a domestic arbitration award. If this is so, then the United
States merely needs to fine-tune its arbitration law to exclude B2C con-
sumer disputes. The unfortunate side effect would be to relegate B2C con-
sumer arbitration to the individual states for such consumer protection, if
any, as each state may deem appropriate. This interpretation, while increas-
ing consumer protection in transnational ODR, will cause unnecessary con-
fusion and may even provide less protection for consumers in domestic
arbitration, if one assumes a race to the bottom in choice of arbitral forum
clauses governing these disputes. In short, it is not clear that the Unites
States, as a practical matter, could exclude B2C arbitration awards from the
scope of the New York Convention without unnecessary violence to domes-
tic arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.
6. Violated the Public Policy of the Jurisdiction
"Each state may decide, in accordance with its own economic and so-
cial policy, which matters may be settled by arbitration and which may
not. ' ,269 "In arbitration, the concept of public policy defines the margin of
autonomy-and possibly error-of an arbitral tribunal which the public au-
thority is willing to tolerate. 27 ° One reading of New York Convention
would permit courts to evaluate the award in light of domestic public policy
considerations, for example the need to protect consumers. Such a reading
would solve many of the thorny issues surrounding e-consumer arbitra-
tion. 71 A nation may attempt to exclude B2C from arbitration under the
266 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
660 n.35 (1985) (quoting Compagnia Generale Construzioni v. Piersanti, [1980] Foro Itali-
ano 1 190, in 6 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 229, 230 (1981) ("the Corte di Cassazione in Italy has held
that labor disputes are not arbitrable under the Convention in that country.")).
... William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
805, 810 (1999).268 Id.; New York Convention, supra note 43, at Art. II ("There shall not be imposed
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or en-
forcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the rec-
ognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.").
269 William Grantham, Comment, The Arbitrability of International Intellectual Property
Disputes, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 173, 179 (1996). "The recognition of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country." New York Convention, supra note 43, at Art.
V(Christoph Liebscher, European Public Policy after ECO Swiss, 10 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 81, 89 (1999).
27 Arguendo, an award that cannot be enforced because it violates public policy may also
be an award in a matter that is not capable of arbitration. Compare Art. V(2)(a) with Art. II
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New York Convention as a matter of domestic public policy. Nevertheless,
this facile solution may not be consistent with a more reasonable interpreta-
tion of the New York Convention.2 2
Courts and commentators have read into the public policy provision of
the New York Convention a further limitation that the arbitral award vio-
lates a core principle of the nation's public policy.273 The text of the New
York Convention suggests such a narrow interpretation. "The French text
of the Convention, which is considered equally authentic, uses the term
'ordre public,' which may have a different meaning., 274 "Arbitration litera-
ture tends to use the terms 'public policy' and 'ordre public' interchangea-
bly, although there is a view that the latter term has a wider scope than the
former., 275 Ordre public encompasses a concept sometimes referred to as
"ordre public interne. 276 Under ordre public interne, judges may prevent
the enforcement of the arbitration award to prevent enforcement of transac-
tions which are "held to offend public order" or prevent parties from con-
tracting around mandatory statutory requirements. There is a related
concept "ordre public externe," and "in the area of private international law,
is interchangeable with public policy. 27 7 Governments may invoke ordre
public externe to prevent application of a foreign law, otherwise applicable
under principles of international law, on the basis that the foreign law
"would sanction conduct that offends against the forum's concept of fun-
of the New York Convention, supra note 44; see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 164 n.9 (1 st Cir. 1983) affin'd in part, rev'd in part
by 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 530-31 n.10
(1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting)).
272 Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, U.N.
ESCOR, 19th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 14 § 49, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/2704 and Corr. 1,
E/AC. 42/4/Rev. 1 (1955) (Public policy exception to be limited "to cases in which the rec-
ognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award would be distinctly contrary to the basic
principles of the legal system where the award in invoked."); Arizona v. California, 292 U.S.
341, 359-60 (1934) ("when the meaning of a treaty is not clear, recourse may be had to the
negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties to
establish its meaning.").
273 Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975) (This provision
"is to be construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate the forum
state's most basic notions of morality and justice."); see, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Over-
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damental norms."
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The better reading of the New York Convention is that the public pol-
icy exception requires a court to enforce an arbitration award unless that
award violates a fundamental core value of the legal system of the country
requested to enforce the arbitral award. Therefore, it is unlikely that consis-
tent with treaty obligations under the New York Convention member states
could exclude B2C transactions from the scope of the New York Conven-
tion.
E. Modifying the New York Convention
The New York Convention was written over forty years ago, and it has
not been revisited to reflect the market realities of a new millennium-a
post-industrial revolution information-driven economy. 279 The New York
Convention reflects an immediate post-WWII concept of international trade
that clearly envisioned sophisticated merchants capable of ordering their
business affairs across national borders and arbitraging for the risks associ-
ated with transnational commerce. This paradigm does not reflect the typi-
cal B2C e-commerce transaction. Because it is unclear whether the New
York Convention will permit nations to protect consumers in B2C trans-
border arbitrations, it must be revisited to provide explicitly for the interests
of consumers, and perhaps small merchants, engaging in trans-border trans-
actions. The treaty should be amended to permit nations to exclude certain
types of consumer transactions from the scope of international arbitration or
to permit nations to require minimal consumer safeguards in arbitrating dis-
putes arising out of B2C transactions. Finally, the treaty should reflect the
reality of e-commerce transactions, such as formally validating electronic
contracts to arbitrate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
ODR may yet meet the needs of B2C e-commerce. A core function of
any dispute resolution policy is to inspire confidence. If consumers are not
confident that their disputes will be resolved fairly, they will either avoid e-
commerce or discount the value of the e-goods or e-services to account for
the perceived risks associated with e-commerce. Either option would create
an inefficient e-commerce marketplace. Theoretical and empirical data
suggest that without structural intervention, e-markets may not provide pri-
vate dispute resolution that inspires consumer confidence in its efficiency,
accuracy, and integrity. This suggests government regulation, but there is a
danger that government regulation may stifle innovation at the birth of
278 Id.
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ODR.
Therefore, government's role in ODR must be subtle and marginal.
Governments should lead voluntary market efforts to change structural in-
centives but not command legal compliance. By providing the appropriate
incentives, governments may encourage the private sector to create ODR
policies and procedures that are fair, comport with due process, and build e-
consumer confidence. This will create private markets for "justice." In the
instances where a private party seeks public enforcement of an arbitral
award in B2C disputes, governments should provide a thorough independ-
ent review of the private award to insure that it comports to the public pol-
icy concerns of due process and fair play and that it facilitates consumer
protection policies.
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